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The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice 
Searches, and the Fourth Amendment 
“Rule Requiring Notice” 
Jonathan Witmer-Rich* 
This article documents the rapid rise of covert searching, through 
delayed notice search warrants, and argues that covert searching in its 
current form presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment’s “rule 
requiring notice.” 
 
Congress authorized these “sneak and peek” warrants in the USA 
Patriot Act of 2001, and soon after added a reporting requirement to 
monitor this invasive search technique.  Since 2001, the use of delayed 
notice search warrants has risen dramatically, from around 25 in 2002 to 
5601 in 2012, suggesting that “sneak and peek” searches are becoming 
alarmingly common.  In fact, it is not at all clear whether true “sneak and 
peek” searches are on the rise.  The data are confounded with other types of 
searches and thus are failing to capture what Congress intended.  This 
article proposes an amendment to the reporting requirement to fix this 
problem and allow adequate monitoring of “sneak and peek” searches. 
 
To date, most courts have concluded that delayed notice search 
warrants raise no Fourth Amendment concerns.  This article argues to the 
contrary.  As a matter of Fourth Amendment first principles, covert searches 
infringe on the privacy and sanctity of the home.  Moreover, history shows 
that delayed notice warrants are a modern procedural innovation, and did 
not exist at common law in the years leading up to the drafting of the Fourth 
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Amendment in 1791.  Instead, covert searches presumptively violate the 
Fourth Amendment “rule requiring notice”—a principle deeply rooted in 
the history of search and seizure law, and meant to protect against many of 
the dangers created by covert, delayed notice searching.  
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Congress passed the USA Patriot Act soon after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, giving federal authorities new powers to detect and 
prevent terrorism.1  One of the lesser-noticed provisions authorized “sneak 
and peek” searches using “delayed notice search warrants”—warrants 
providing for covert searches of American homes and businesses.2  The law 
also authorizes “sneak and steal” searches—delayed notice search warrants 
that allow the government to seize evidence or contraband during the secret 
search.3  In “sneak and steal” cases, police often stage the seizure to 
resemble a burglary, perhaps by a rival drug gang, to prevent the target from 
suspecting a government search.4 
 
 1.  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (“To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law 
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”).  A Department of Justice summary of the 
USA Patriot Act states that “Congress enacted the Patriot Act by overwhelming, bipartisan margins, 
arming law enforcement with new tools to detect and prevent terrorism.”  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The 
USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/what_is_the_ 
patriot_act.pdf.   
 2.  USA PATRIOT Act § 352.  Since the Patriot Act was passed, only a few law review articles 
have focused on the delayed notice search warrant provision.  See Robert M. Duncan Jr., 
Surreptitious Search Warrants and the USA Patriot Act: “Thinking Outside the Box but Within the 
Constitution,” or a Violation of Fourth Amendment Protections?, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1 (2004); 
Nathan H. Seltzer, Still Sneaking & Peeking, 42 CRIM. L. BULL., Summer 2006, at 1; Nathan H. 
Seltzer, When History Matters Not: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of the Secret Search, 40 
CRIM. L. BULL., March 2004, at 1; Brett A. Shumate, From “Sneak and Peek” to “Sneak and Steal”: 
Section 213 of the USA Patriot Act, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 203 (2006). 
 3.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2) (2012).  See Shumate, supra note 2. 
 4.  The terminology for these searches is contested.  Congress refers to the practice as obtaining 
a “delayed notice” search warrant.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a.  Courts and commentators often use the 
colorful labels “sneak and peek” and “sneak and steal.”  See, e.g., United States v. Mikos, 539 F.3d 
706, 709 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005); Kevin Corr, 
Sneaky but Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peek Search Warrants, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103 (1995); 
Shumate, supra note 2.  Former U.S. Deputy Attorney General James Comey has complained that 
“[w]e in law enforcement do not call them [sneak and peek warrants] because it conveys this image 
that we are looking through your sock drawer while you are taking a nap.”  James B. Comey, 
Fighting Terrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 403, 410 (2006).  Notably, 
Comey did not claim this negative image is inaccurate (except that police with delayed notice 
warrants look through your sock drawer when you are out of the house, rather than asleep), but 
rather that law enforcement would prefer the public not adopt that alarming image.  The 
government’s phraseology—”delayed notice search warrant”—is less descriptive and potentially 
misleading.  The most salient feature of a delayed notice search warrant is the secrecy of the search.  
The fact that the occupant learns of this covert search a month or two later is certainly important, but 
of secondary concern.  This article uses the phrases “sneak and peek” and “sneak and steal,” as well 
as “covert search” or “covert, delayed notice search,” to focus attention on the fact that the practice 
at issue is a secret government search.  
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The Department of Justice, as well as legislators, claimed that the 
delayed notice warrant statute merely codified existing law and practice5 and 
that “sneak and peek” searches should be used rarely—only “when it really, 
really matters.”6  In 2005, as part of the Patriot Act Re-Authorization, 
Congress created a reporting requirement for delayed notice search warrants, 
designed to allow Congress—and the public—to see how frequently, and for 
what purposes, investigators were conducting “sneak and peek” searches.7 
Data from the past six years shows an explosion in federal delayed 
notice search warrants, from around 174 warrants issued in 2006 to 5,601 in 
2012—an astonishing rise.8  Seventy-five percent of delayed notice warrants 
are used in drug investigations; less than one percent are used in terrorism 
investigations.9  On its face, the data is cause for alarm, suggesting that a 
tool Congress intended to be used rarely, only when truly needed, has 
become commonplace in routine investigations.   
Upon further investigation, it is far from clear that this story is accurate.  
The reported data likely includes a mix of different types of searches: some 
“sneak and peek” searches of physical spaces, some covert GPS monitoring, 
some covert cell phone location tracking, and some covert e-mail 
collection.10  While each of these types of searches is worth monitoring, the 
existing data does not distinguish among them, making the data much less 
useful.11  Moreover, many of these searches are showing up in the data in 
increasing numbers, not necessarily because the searches are increasing 
 
 5.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DELAYED NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS: A VITAL AND TIME-
HONORED TOOL FOR FIGHTING CRIME 3 (2004) (“[S]ection 213 merely codified the authority that 
law enforcement had already possessed for decades and clarified the standard for its application.”); 
147 CONG. REC. 20,704 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (Delayed notice search warrants “are 
already used throughout the United States, throughout our whole country.  The bill simply codifies 
and clarifies the practice . . . .”); see also infra Part I.A. 
 6.  Comey, supra note 4, at 410. 
 7.  H.R. REP. NO. 109-333 (2005) (Section 114 (Delayed Notice of Search Warrants) of section 
3103a was amended by adding subsection (d), requiring judges to issue reports to the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts stating (1) the fact that a delayed notice warrant was applied for, (2)  
whether it was granted, denied, or modified, (3) the period of delay, and the number and duration of 
extensions, and (4) the offense specified in the warrant).   
 8.  See infra Part I.B. 
 9.  From fiscal year 2006 through 2011, the percentage of all delayed notice warrants that were 
requested for drug investigations is as follows: 75% (2006); 72% (2007); 62% (2008); 7% (2009); 
74% (2010); 72% (2011).  The percentage used in terrorism investigations is as follows: 0% (2006); 
1.4% (2007); 0.4% (2008); 0.5% (2009); 0.9% (2010); 0.3% (2011).  See infra note 130. 
 10.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 11.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
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(though they may be), but because of a coincidental change in how the 
searches are conducted—making the data even less informative.12   
In particular, the inclusion of these other types of covert searches makes 
it impossible to do what Congress intended when it passed the reporting 
requirement—to monitor the highly intrusive practice of covert searches of 
homes and businesses, the paradigmatic “sneak and peek” search.13 
While the data is inconclusive, the statute nevertheless gives cause for 
concern.  Congress did not merely codify pre-Patriot Act case law—it chose 
to enact the less exacting of at least two competing standards.  Since then, 
courts continue to issue “sneak and peek” warrants, but have not subjected 
them to meaningful constitutional scrutiny.  Most courts conclude that 
providing “notice” of a search is at most a requirement of the criminal 
rules—subject to the statutory exception authorizing delayed notice 
warrants—not a requirement of the Fourth Amendment.14  Few 
commentators have examined delayed notice warrants, and most follow the 
courts in concluding that the practice raises no serious Fourth Amendment 
issues.15  
 
 12.  See infra Part I.B.3. 
 13.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 14.  See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Christopher, Crim. No. 2008-0023, 
2009 WL 903764, at *7 (D.V.I. Mar. 31, 2009) (“The procedural requirements for giving notice after 
execution of a valid search warrant are ministerial tasks and a failure to comply therewith, without 
more, does not amount to deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights . . . .”); United States v. Ludwig, 
902 F. Supp. 121, 126–27 (W.D. Tex. 1995); California v. Ceja, Nos. H021664, H021697, 2001 WL 
1246632, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2001).  The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has long held that 
covert searching does raise Fourth Amendment concerns.  See United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 
1451 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 15.  See Corr, supra note 4; Duncan, supra note 2; Paul V. Konovalov, Note, On a Quest for 
Reason: A New Look at Surreptitious Search Warrants, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 435 (1997); Shumate, 
supra note 2.  One commentator has consistently argued that delayed notice search warrants raise 
serious Fourth Amendment problems.  Seltzer, When History Matters Not, supra note 2; Seltzer, Still 
Sneaking & Peeking, supra note 2.  A number of articles on the USA Patriot Act generally include 
sections briefly discussing delayed notice search warrants, without subjecting that topic to much 
sustained analysis.  See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the 
War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 785–89 (2006); Comey, supra 
note 4, at 410–12; Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA Patriot Act, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1183–90 (2004); Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: 
FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1141 (2007); Susan Nevelow Mart, The Chains of the Constitution and Legal Process in the Library: 
A Post-USA Patriot Act Reauthorization Act Assessment, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 435, 481–85 
(2008); Martha Minow, What is the Greatest Evil?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2134, 2145 n.42 (2005) 
(reviewing MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 
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This article makes two key contributions.  First, it examines what data is 
available about delayed notice search warrants, and explains why Congress’s 
reporting requirement is broken—and how it should be fixed.16   
Second, it argues that “sneak and peek” searches do raise a serious 
Fourth Amendment issue.17  This conclusion is based on Fourth Amendment 
first principles, the history of notice at common law in the years leading up 
to the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that the Fourth Amendment requires searchers to give notice of a 
search and demand entry—a point that has been overlooked by courts and 
commentators evaluating delayed notice search warrants.18 
As a matter of first principles, covert searches strike at the heart of 
fundamental Fourth Amendment interests in the privacy and sanctity of the 
home, and in the freedom from covert government surveillance.19  The 
covert nature of a search raises Fourth Amendment privacy concerns distinct 
from those of the physical invasion itself, including the sanctity and repose 
of the home.20  The practice of covert searching also unsettles the privacy of 
the entire political community, leaving all individuals to wonder whether 
their home or business has been secretly searched.  As a result, covert 
searching threatens to chill individual liberty to live, believe, and act without 
fearing that the government is watching.   
Some covert searches also include secret seizures—”sneak and steal” 
cases in which police take evidence and disguise the scene to look like a 
burglary.21  These covert seizures carry additional costs, including physical 
damage to the home and the fear of burglary.22  Moreover, some persons 
targeted by government burglaries may well retaliate against suspected 
perpetrators—such as a rival drug dealer—giving rise to a cascade of 
violence.23      
 
(2004)) (“The Patriot Act’s authorization of ‘sneak-and-peek’ warrants—allowing for delayed 
notification to the subject—also seems to violate the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure absent a strong demonstration of need, at least for the broad scope permitted.”). 
 16.  See infra Part I. 
 17.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 18.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 19.  See infra Part II.A. 
 20.  See infra Part II.A. 
 21.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2) (authorizing covert seizures upon a showing of “reasonable 
necessity”); Shumate, supra note 2. 
 22.  See infra Part II.B. 
 23.  See infra Part II.B. 
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To date, no court or commentator has examined the history of search 
and seizure, in the founding era, for evidence of covert searching or delayed 
notice warrants.24  Yet one senator claimed that the practice of covert, 
delayed notice searching has been upheld as constitutional “from the 
beginning of this country.”25  On the contrary, the historical record shows 
that delayed notice search warrants are a recent innovation.26  There is no 
evidence of judicially authorized covert searching, through a delayed notice 
warrant or any similar mechanism, in the history of search and seizure 
through 1791.27  This fact alone does not show that delayed notice warrants 
are unconstitutional, or that the founders would have rejected them, but it 
should prompt a healthy skepticism about the legitimacy of the practice.  
History and first principles come together in the “rule requiring 
notice”—the common law rule, now part of the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness requirement, that persons executing a search warrant must 
ordinarily announce their presence and demand entry before forcibly 
entering.28  Courts and commentators commonly refer to this as “knock and 
announce” rule,29 and have never considered whether this rule has any 
bearing on covert searching with delayed notice warrants.30  This doctrinal 
separation has never been explained, and it is unjustified.  On its face, covert 
searching plainly runs afoul of the common law, and constitutional, “rule 
requiring notice.”31  A delayed notice search is simply an extreme version of 
the “no-knock” search,32 with notice delayed by weeks or months rather than 
minutes.33  Moreover, a deeper look at the purposes underlying the “knock 
 
 24.  See infra Part III. 
 25.  147 CONG. REC. 20,704 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 26.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
 27.  See infra Part III.A. 
 28.  See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (finding that the principle of 
announcement “is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment,” but 
recognizing that it “was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all 
circumstances.”). 
 29.  Id. passim. 
 30.  See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 31.  See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (explaining that these covert searches 
essentially allow the government to search homes and businesses unannounced, which contradicts 
with the notice requirement). 
 32.  See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (stating that the “no-knock” entry 
exception to the “knock and announce” rules is only justified if the police have reasonable suspicion 
that knocking and announcing their presence would be dangerous or would inhibit effective 
investigation of the crime). 
 33.  See infra note 43 (describing a delayed notice search). 
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and announce rule”—better called the “rule requiring notice”—shows that 
delayed notice search warrants implicate similar and overlapping concerns.34   
For all of these reasons—Fourth Amendment first principles, the 
absence of delayed notice searching in the founding era, and the Fourth 
Amendment “rule requiring notice”—delayed notice search warrants must 
be subjected to exacting constitutional scrutiny that has been largely absent 
in judicial decisions to date.35   
In a separate article, I argue that covert searching, with delayed notice 
search warrants, may sometimes serve sufficiently compelling government 
interests to justify the serious privacy intrusion that that practice entails.36  
That article examines the current statutory regime, explaining why that 
regime fails to meaningfully curb the practice of delayed notice searching.37  
That article also proposes several solutions that would render the practice 
constitutionally reasonable, permitting covert searches when the government 
interest is sufficiently compelling, while prohibiting the use of this invasive 
search technique when it is merely convenient.38 
Part I of this article describes the explosion in legal covert searches 
following the statutory authorization of delayed notice search warrants by 
Congress.  Part I.A explains the current legal rules for delayed notice search 
warrants, and how those rules have evolved over time though both case law 
and legislation in the USA Patriot Act.  Part I.B provides an empirical 
description of how these warrants are being used and explains the likely 
flaws in this data resulting from coincidental legal changes in how other 
forms of covert surveillance are conducted.  Part I.B then proposes a 
relatively simple fix—one that could be imposed through legislation or 
perhaps regulation—that would enable Congress, and the public, to 
effectively monitor all of these types of covert searches.   
Part II turns to Fourth Amendment first principles, explaining how 
covert searching infringes on the core values—the private sanctity and 
repose of the home—that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.  
Part II argues that delayed notice search warrants thus raise constitutional 
 
 34.  See infra Part III.B. 
 35.  See, e.g., United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev’d, 800 F.2d 1451 
(9th Cir. 1986) (subjecting warrant to normal balancing test rather than heightened scrutiny 
standard). 
 36.  Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Fatal Flaws of the “Sneak and Peek” Statute—and How to Fix 
Them (forthcoming 2014). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
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concerns, and that courts are mistaken in treating “notice” as merely a 
requirement of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, not a 
constitutional principle. 
Part III evaluates covert searching and delayed notice search warrants in 
light of the history of search and seizure in the years leading up to the 
drafting of the Fourth Amendment in 1791.  Part III.A shows that covert 
searching, including any legal mechanism resembling the delayed notice 
search warrant, did not exist in British and colonial common law in the years 
before 1791.  Part III.A also evaluates the import of this history, ultimately 
concluding that the absence of covert searching in 1791 does not resolve the 
constitutionality of the practice.  Part III.B turns to the question of notice and 
the Fourth Amendment more broadly, relying both on history and the 
Supreme Court’s modern doctrine to conclude that providing notice at the 
time of the search is a component of whether a search is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Part IV concludes. 
I.  THE RAPID RISE OF DELAYED NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS  
“Sneak and peek” searching existed for some time before Congress 
authorized the practice in the USA Patriot Act.39  This section traces the 
legal history of “sneak and peek” searching, sets forth the current statutory 
scheme, and then turns to examine the data now available on delayed notice 
searching.40  It then explains why that data likely paints a misleading picture, 
and how the law should be amended to provide meaningful data and enable 
congressional and public oversight.41 
A.  The Legal Development of Covert Searching and Delayed Notice Search 
Warrants  
Delayed notice search warrants are authorized in 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, 
enacted as part of the USA Patriot Act in the wake of 9/11.42  In its current 
form, § 3103a allows investigators to delay givingnotice if “the court finds 
reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the 
execution of the warrant may have an adverse result,” a term defined 
 
 39.  See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 40.  See infra Part I.A. 
 41.  See infra Part I.B. 
 42.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2012). 
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separately.43  Notice of executing a search warrant is ordinarily required by 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides in part 
that 
[t]he officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the warrant 
and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or 
from whose premises, the property was taken or leave a copy of the 
warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the 
property.44   
Section 3103a creates an exception to that requirement. 
Under § 3103a, the warrant must include a provision for giving notice to 
the person whose home was searched “within a reasonable period not to 
exceed 30 days after the date of its execution, or on a later date certain if the 
facts of the case justify a longer period of delay.”45  The notice can be further 
extended “for good cause shown.”46  A “sneak and steal” search—seizing 
property during a covert search and staging a burglary—is permitted only if 
“the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure.”47 
Thus, § 3103a allows for delayed notice—that is to say, a covert search 
with notice given later—in cases in which conducting an ordinary search 
“may have an adverse result.”48  Congress provided that the term “adverse 
result” has the same meaning as given in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (part of the 
Stored Communications Act) with one exception.49  As defined in § 2705, an 
“adverse result” for purposes of obtaining a delayed notice search warrant 
consists of any of the following:  “(A) endangering the life or physical safety 
of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of or tampering 
with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise 
seriously jeopardizing an investigation or  unduly delaying a trial.”50 
The first three items on this list—subsections (A) through (C)—closely 
 
 43.  Id. § 3103a(b)(1). 
 44.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C) (2010). 
 45.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3). 
 46.   Id. § 3103a(c). 
 47.  Id. § 3103a(b)(2). 
 48.  Id. § 3103a(b)(1). 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. § 2705(a)(2).  This section also includes “unduly delaying a trial” as a reason to delay 
notice under the Stored Communications Act.  Id. § 2705(a)(2)(E).  In § 3103a, providing for 
delayed notice search warrants, Congress specifically rejected “unduly delaying a trial” as a reason 
for giving delayed notice of a conventional warrant.  Id. § 3103a(b)(1). 
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resemble the Fourth Amendment categories of “exigent circumstances.”51  
The other two “adverse results,” listed in subsections (D) and (E), are not 
traditional “exigent circumstances.”  Section (D)—preventing intimidation 
of a potential witness—can perhaps be analogized to preventing the 
destruction of evidence, a traditional exigent circumstance.52  Section (E)—
preventing serious jeopardy to an investigation—seems to be a broader, 
more general justification that lacks historical or doctrinal support as a 
reason to bypass notice.53   
1.  History of “Sneak and Peek” Searching 
Delayed notice search warrants first appeared in a reported judicial 
decision in 1985.54  The DEA agent who requested the warrant in that case 
claimed an earlier precedent, stating “that he knew that there had at one time 
been issued a surreptitious entry warrant in Oakland.”55  This is the earliest 
evidence of a warrant expressly authorizing a covert search in Anglo-
American legal history.  As will be shown in Part III.A, there is no evidence 
of any delayed notice search warrants in the British or colonial courts before 
the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, and no mention of this practice in the 
United States until this case in 1985.  It may be impossible to date the first 
search warrant to expressly authorize a covert search, but the absence of any 
appearance in the case law before 1985 suggests the practice did not exist 
much earlier. 
There is long history, predating 1985, of governments conducting covert 
searches of homes and businesses without notifying the occupants—but this 
practice was understood to be illegal, and was not conducted pursuant to 
judicial oversight or express statutory authorization.56  In what were known 
as “black bag jobs,” the FBI long conducted secret break-ins, searches, and 
 
 51.  See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (exigent circumstances include 
preventing danger to officer or others, preventing escape of a suspect when in hot pursuit, and 
preventing the imminent destruction of evidence); Witmer-Rich, supra note 36.  
 52.  See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (describing the prevention of destruction of 
evidence as an exigent circumstance). 
 53.  See Witmer-Rich, supra note 36 (examining these five exceptions). 
 54.  United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev’d, 800 F.2d 1451 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
 55.  United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1986) (Poole, J., dissenting) (quoting 
affidavit). 
 56.  HENRY M. HOLDEN, FBI 100 YEARS: AN UNOFFICIAL HISTORY 215 (Steve Gansen ed., 
2008). 
[Vol. 41: 509, 2014] The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
520 
seizures of homes and businesses, never revealing that the break-in was the 
work of law enforcement.57  The FBI typically concealed these activities by 
staging them to look like break-ins by ordinary burglars.     
An internal FBI memorandum in 1966 stated frankly that “[w]e do not 
obtain authorization for ‘black bag’ jobs from outside the Bureau,” because 
“such a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would 
be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it.”58  Despite their patent 
illegality, black bag jobs were used “because they represent an invaluable 
technique in combating subversive activities.”59  Thus, FBI leaders knew of 
these covert searches and pursued them when the goal appeared sufficiently 
valuable, but also understood that the practice was illegal. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, secret government break-ins and staged 
burglaries slowly transitioned from the shadows of illegal government 
conduct to the more respectable position of a judicially overseen process, a 
transition that culminated in Congress giving express statutory authorization 
for delayed notice search warrants in section 213 of the USA Patriot Act.60  
In 2005, Congress added a reporting requirement to monitor how often 
delayed notice searches were being conducted, and for what sorts of 
crimes.61   
In the first reported decision addressing delayed notice search warrants, 
Judge Eugene Lynch ruled that delayed notice search warrants were 
constitutionally permissible, but only within strict limits.62  Judge Lynch 
stated that “the privacy interests implicated here are substantial, [but] even 
highly intrusive searches may pass constitutional scrutiny provided there are 
sufficiently compelling reasons for the search and adequate safeguards to 
protect against potential abuse.”63  Noting the absence of controlling 
authority on point, the court analogized delayed notice warrants to Title III 
wiretaps, which likewise authorize a search without contemporaneous notice 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to FBI Deputy Director Cartha (Deke) DeLoach 
(July 19, 1966) (reprinted in HENRY M. HOLDEN, FBI 100 YEARS: AN UNOFFICIAL HISTORY 215 
(2008)). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 1. 
 61.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(d) (2012). 
 62.  United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560, 1570–71 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev’d, 800 F.2d 1451 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
 63.  Id. at 1570. 
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to the party being searched.64  The court highlighted several Title III 
procedural limitations: (1) “the requirement that an inventory of the 
intercepted communications be sent to the surveilled parties ‘within a 
reasonable time’ after the surveillance is terminated”; and (2) the “necessity” 
or “exhaustion” requirement that “normal investigative procedures have 
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried 
or be too dangerous.”65   
Applying these limitations, the court observed that the warrant failed on 
both counts: “the surreptitious entry warrant contained no provision 
whatsoever for notice to Raymond Freitas or any other interested party,” 
even retrospectively; and the affidavit “made no reference to the inadequacy 
of other investigative techniques apart from the surreptitious entry.”66  In 
light of these failures, the court held that even if surreptitious entry might 
sometimes be constitutionally permissible, it had “no difficulty concluding 
that the surreptitious entry of [Freitas’s] residence violated the Fourth 
Amendment.”67 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit fundamentally agreed with these key 
points.68  It emphasized the significant privacy intrusion at stake:  
[S]urreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very 
heart of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.  The 
mere thought of strangers walking through and visually examining 
the center of our privacy interest, our home, arouses our passion for 
freedom as does nothing else.  That passion, the true source of the 
Fourth Amendment, demands that surreptitious entries be closely 
circumscribed.69 
 
 64.  Id. at 1570–71. 
 65.  Id. at 1571 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (notice); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (necessity)). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.   Id. 
 68.  United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).  The Ninth Circuit declined to 
state whether a showing of necessity was required by the Fourth Amendment, although it added that 
a showing of necessity “could have strengthened the claim that the search and seizure in this case 
met the commands of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id.   
 69.  Id. at 1456.  The Ninth Circuit remanded the question of whether the good faith exception 
applied, and ultimately held (in a later appeal) that it did.  United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425 
(9th Cir. 1988).  During the Congressional debate over delayed notice search warrants in the fall of 
2001, Senator Patrick Leahy read the quote from Freitas into the record as reflecting his concerns 
over delayed notice search warrants.  147 CONG. REC. 20,683 (2001). 
[Vol. 41: 509, 2014] The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
522 
Delayed notice search warrants received a more welcomed reception in 
the Second Circuit—the only other circuit to address the practice before § 
3103a was enacted.70  In United States v. Villegas, the Second Circuit upheld 
a delayed notice search warrant used to secretly search a farmhouse in rural 
New York.71  In contrast with the Ninth Circuit, the Villegas court 
minimized the privacy intrusion.72  Comparing surreptitious searches to 
conventional searches and Title III wiretaps, the court claimed that  
in many ways [a surreptitious search] is the least intrusive of these 
three types of searches.  It is less intrusive than a conventional 
search with physical seizure because the latter deprives the owner 
not only of privacy but also of the use of his property.  It is less 
intrusive than a wiretap or video camera surveillance because the 
physical search is of relatively short duration, focuses the search 
specifically on the items listed in the warrant, and produces 
information as of a given moment, whereas the electronic 
surveillance is ongoing and indiscriminate, gathering in any 
activities within its mechanical focus.73 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit endorsed the same two limitations 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, although in weaker form: first, officers must 
show “reasonable necessity for the delay,” and second, officers must provide 
notice “within a reasonable time after the covert entry.”74  Notably, the court 
did not clarify whether these requirements flowed from the Fourth 
Amendment itself (as the Ninth Circuit held) or whether they were merely 
common law or rule-based requirements.75  The Second Circuit did make it 
clear that neither requirement was terribly exacting.  The court stated that the 
“necessity” requirement for surreptitious searches should not be as rigorous 
as Title III’s requirement that “normal investigative procedures have been 
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried 
or to be too dangerous.”76  Instead, officers need only show that “there is 
 
 70.  See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 1337. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.   Id. 
 75.  Cf. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 76.  Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2012)). 
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good reason for delay.”77  Second, the court stated that seven days was a 
good starting point for delayed notice, but emphasized that “[f]or good 
cause, the issuing court may thereafter extend the period of delay.”78   
A few years later, in United States v. Pangburn, the Second Circuit 
continued down the path of eroding the safeguards first articulated in 
Freitas.79  The court in Pangburn noted that “[n]o provision specifically 
requiring notice of the execution of a search warrant is included in the 
Fourth Amendment,”80 and concluded that notice was required only by Rule 
41, not by the Fourth Amendment.81  The district court in Pangburn had 
suppressed the evidence because the “delayed notice” warrant failed to 
require that notice of the covert search ever be given.82  On appeal, the 
Second Circuit held that suppression was not required, since the failure to 
provide notice was only a statutory violation, not a constitutional one.83  
Thus, over the course of about eight years, courts embraced delayed notice 
search warrants and questioned whether notice was even a part of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
A few years later, in an apparently separate constitutional universe, the 
Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Arkansas, holding that the common law 
“knock and announce” rule for executing search warrants was in fact part of 
the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement.84  In a unanimous 
decision by Justice Thomas, the Court held that “part of the reasonableness 
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment” includes the rule from “the common 
law of search and seizure” that a law enforcement officer “generally . . . first 
ought to announce his presence and authority” before breaking into a home 
to execute a warrant.85   
While lower federal court judges (and litigants) presumably became 
aware of Wilson, they apparently confined that decision to a discrete “knock 
and announce” doctrinal box.  In all of the delayed notice search warrant 
cases following Wilson, no court to date has once mentioned Wilson or its 
 
 77.  Id. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.  United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 80.  Id. at 453. 
 81.  Id. at 449–50. 
 82.  Id. (describing district court ruling). 
 83.  Id. at 449. 
 84.  514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995). 
 85.  Id. at 929. 
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notice requirement.86  No court (or, apparently, litigant) seems to have 
realized that, when evaluating whether warrants that expressly fail to provide 
notice of the search are constitutionally permissible, the starting point must 
be the Supreme Court decision that “leaves no doubt that the reasonableness 
of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement 
officers announced their presence and authority prior to entering.”87  Instead, 
courts continued analyzing delayed notice search warrants under cases like 
Pangburn, which had held that notice was not part of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.88  At that level of generality, at least, Wilson clearly 
overruled Pangburn, yet courts have not yet noticed this issue. 
Instead of considering the holding in Wilson, courts sometimes cited 
Dalia v. United States for the proposition that notice is not required by the 
Fourth Amendment.89  In Dalia, the defendant argued that police had 
violated the Fourth Amendment by covertly entering his office to install 
“bugging equipment.”90  The Court rejected the argument, holding that “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the 
purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.”91  The 
 
 86.  Each of the following cases, all decided after Wilson was handed down on May 22, 1995, 
contain at least a mention of a delayed notice or “sneak and peek” search warrants.  Some of these 
cases analyze a delayed notice search warrant or a failure to give notice; others merely mention 
delayed notice search warrants in passing.  None of the cases discuss or cite Wilson or the “knock 
and announce” rule.  United States v. Andrews, 471 F. App’x 824 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Mikos, 539 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding, without mentioning Wilson, that the 
failure to announce a search or leave a copy of the warrant did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Christopher, Crim. No. 2008-0023, 2009 WL 903764 (D.V.I. Mar. 
31, 2009); United States v. Prentice, No. CR06-296C, 2007 WL 208068 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 
2007); United States v. Hernandez, No. 07-60027-CR, 2007 WL 2915856 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2007); 
United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2005); 
United States v. Chimera, 201 F.R.D. 72 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Heatley, 41 F. Supp. 2d 
284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Rollack, 90 F. Supp. 2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States 
v. Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (upholding delayed notice search warrant; no 
mention of Wilson, which was decided five months earlier); People v. Vasquez, No. G037613, 2007 
WL 3105890 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2007); People v. Ceja, Nos. H021664, H021697, 2001 WL 
1246632 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2001). 
 87.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931. 
 88.  See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 403 (citing Pangburn for the proposition that “the notice 
requirement found in Rule 41(d) is not required by the Fourth Amendment”); Christopher, 2009 WL 
903764, at *5 (relying on Pangburn); Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. at 126 (same); Ceja, 2001 WL 1246632, 
at *8 (same). 
 89.  441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
 90.  Id. at 241–42. 
 91.  Id. at 248. 
[Vol. 41: 509, 2014] The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
525 
Second Circuit cited Dalia as support for concluding that the Fourth 
Amendment contains no notice requirement at all.92  Of course, stating that 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry does not 
amount to holding that the Fourth Amendment contains no notice 
requirement at all.   
The connection between Wilson’s ruling and covert searching, and the 
relevance of Dalia to this question, is discussed in Part III.  For present 
purposes, what is most notable is that courts to date, in evaluating the 
constitutionality of delayed notice search warrants, have completely 
disregarded Wilson and the “notice” requirement—without explaining why 
that constitutional notice requirement does not apply. 
2.  Congressional Authorization of Delayed Notice Search Warrants 
In the context of this relatively sparse case law, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) began seeking explicit statutory authority to conduct delayed 
notice searches.93  The DOJ eventually prevailed in the USA Patriot Act, 
which was passed soon after 9/11.94  As early as September 12, the DOJ 
began evaluating and assembling proposed legislation to respond to the 
crisis.95  On September 19, 2001, the DOJ first presented its legislative 
proposal in a meeting with congressional and White House leaders.96  Over 
the next weeks, Attorney General John Ashcroft worked with Senator 
Patrick Leahy and other legislators to craft the bill that became the USA 
Patriot Act.97 
The Patriot Act was not a unified, comprehensive statutory scheme for 
combating terrorism, but rather a pastiche of amendments and additions to 
existing statutes that would, in the view of the DOJ, provide new tools to 
 
 92.  United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 1993).  
 93.  For example, delayed notice search warrants were proposed and rejected as part of the 
Children’s Health Act of 2000.  146 CONG. REC. 19,757  (2000) (statement of Rep. Asa Hutchinson) 
(“There are some of the objections raised by the methamphetamine legislation that were deleted 
from this bill.  For example, provisions allowing for delayed notice of a search warrant have been 
deleted.”). 
 94.  Howell, supra note 15, at 1145; Robert O’Harrow Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 27, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR200605090 
0961.html. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.   Howell, supra note 15, at 1152. 
 97.  O’Harrow, supra note 94. 
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combat terrorism and other crimes.98  One of these provisions was section 
213,99 now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a,100 providing for delayed notice 
search warrants.  Section 213 contained a provision authorizing seizures in 
some surreptitious searches, thus “sneak and peek” searches would 
sometimes become “sneak and steal” searches.101  While the Patriot Act was 
passed as a tool to combat terrorism, a number of the provisions, including 
section 213, were drafted to authorize new investigative tools in any 
criminal case, not only in terrorism investigations.102   
The legislation was passed very quickly after September 11, with the 
first hearing on the administration’s proposal occurring on September 24, 
2001, and the bill finally passing both houses and becoming law on October 
26, 2001.103  The delayed notice search warrant provision was not one of the 
most high-profile parts of the proposal, but it did garner some limited 
commentary during this period.104 
The administration’s core message about delayed notice search 
warrants, repeated various times throughout the debate over the Patriot Act, 
was two-fold.  First, the administration argued that section 213 (along with 
the other tools of the Patriot Act) was critical to enabling investigators to 
combat and prevent terrorism.105  Second, the administration repeatedly 
 
 98.  See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 624 (2003) (“[I]t is crucial to recognize that the Patriot Act is not a single 
coherent law.  The Act collected hundreds of minor amendments to federal law, grouped into ten 
subparts or ‘Titles,’ on topics ranging from immigration to money laundering.  With many of these 
amendments, the devil is in the details . . . .”).  
 99.  In the first versions of the legislation, delayed notice search warrants appeared in section 
352.  Later versions moved the delayed notice search warrant language to section 213. 
 100.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2012). 
 101.  147 CONG. REC. 20,683 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (referring to seizure provision as 
“sneak and steal”). 
 102.  Id. at 20,672 (“This is not done just to combat international terrorism, but for any criminal 
investigation that overlaps a broad definition of ‘foreign intelligence.’”). 
 103.  The USA PATRIOT Act, UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/history/PatriotAct.cfm (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
 104.  See infra notes 105–06. 
 105.  On September 24, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft testified before the House 
Judiciary Committee that the proposed legislation would “provide law enforcement with the tools 
necessary to identify, dismantle, disrupt and punish terrorist organizations before they strike again.”  
Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States).  Deputy Attorney 
General James Comey, testifying during the 2004 debate over the Patriot Act re-authorization, stated 
that the Patriot Act “provided our nation’s law enforcement, national defense, and intelligence 
personnel with enhanced and vital new tools to prevent future terrorist attacks and bring terrorists 
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reassured Congress that section 213 simply created a consistent, uniform 
national standard for an existing practice that had been approved (as 
constitutional) by every court to consider it.106   
Congress did, indeed, create uniformity where it had not previously 
existed—and it did so by rejecting the more restrictive approach from the 
existing case law.  The Ninth Circuit (following Judge Lynch) held that 
covert searching implicated the Fourth Amendment, and held that police 
must show “necessity” (as used in Title III) for a delayed notice search.107  
The Second Circuit, in contrast, held that lack of notice did not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment, and that its version of the “necessity” requirement was 
much looser, requiring only a showing of “good reason for delay.”108  In 
section 213, Congress did not impose a Title III-like “necessity” 
requirement, but instead listed specific reasons that constitute adequate 
reason for delay.109   
The limited debate over delayed notice search warrants reflects a few 
themes.  First, some legislators—unlike some federal judges—repeatedly 
asserted that giving notice of a search is part of the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Representative Spencer Bachus stated that “the fourth 
amendment says we don’t search someone’s house until they’re given 
 
and other dangerous criminals to justice.”  Counterrorism Legislative Review: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of James Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the 
United States).  As for delayed notice warrants in particular, Comey stated that:  
[s]ection 213 of the PATRIOT Act codified and made nationally consistent an existing 
and important tool by expressly authorizing courts to issue delayed notification search 
warrants.  Court-authorized delayed-notice search warrants are a vital aspect of the 
Justice Department’s strategy of prevention—detecting and incapacitating terrorists 
before they are able to strike. 
Id. 
 106.  At the September 24, 2001 House Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative Bachus 
discussed the delayed notice provision with Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff.  
Representative Bachus stated, 
I’m looking at your Justice Department draft on notice, and what it says here is you’re 
going to establish a uniform standard for all searches without notice. . . .  [T]here are 
courts already that have ratified this.  What you say right now is that there’s presently a 
mix of inconsistent rules and practices varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but that 
what you want to do is establish a statutory uniform standard for all notice. 
Chertoff responded, “That’s correct.”  Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statements of Rep. Bachus and Assistant Att’y 
Gen. Michael Chertoff).  See also Shumate, supra note 2 (defending this view). 
 107.  United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 108.  United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 109.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2012). 
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notice.”110  Senator Russell Feingold explained, “[n]otice is a key element of 
fourth amendment protections.”111   
Second, some legislators criticized section 213 on the ground that it 
authorized delayed notice searches in any type of criminal investigation, not 
just terrorism investigations.  For example, Representative Jerrold Nadler 
(D-NY), whose district included the site of the World Trade Center, raised 
this complaint: “There may be justification for delaying notification of 
a search warrant sometimes, but in all criminal investigations?  What does 
that have to do with terrorism?”112 
Finally, several legislators warned that the statute appeared to authorize 
covert searches in a very broad range of cases.113   
Senator Orrin Hatch responded to these critics, emphasizing that the bill 
simply codified a practice that had already been approved by the courts:  
 
 110.  Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Representative Bachus).  Representative Bachus later stated, 
“you’re changing our fundamental laws as opposed to . . . searching their home without a notice, 
which are important fourth amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizures.”  Id.   
 111.  147 CONG. REC. 20,702 (2001).  Jerry Berman, executive director of the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, stated in congressional testimony that “[n]otice is a bedrock Fourth 
Amendment protection from mistaken or abusive searches and seizures.”  Protecting Constitutional 
Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, 
and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 112.  147 CONG. REC. 19,689 (2001).  Representative Bachus warned that the delayed notice 
search warrant provision “doesn’t just involve terrorist activities”—it “involves all Americans.”  
Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. (2001).  Representative Bobby Scott (D-VA) complained that the bill as a whole was not 
targeted only at terrorism:  “First of all, this has limited to do with terrorism. This bill is 
general search warrant and wiretap law.  It is not just limited to terrorism. Had it been limited to 
terrorism, this bill could have passed 3 or 4 weeks ago without much discussion . . . .”  147 CONG. 
REC. 20,443 (2001).  Senator Feingold complained that  
[T]he bill contains some very significant changes in criminal procedure that will apply to 
every federal criminal investigation in this country, not just those involving terrorism.  
One provision would greatly expand the circumstances in which law enforcement 
agencies can search homes and offices without notifying the owner prior to the search. 
147 CONG. REC. 20,702 (2001). 
 113.  Representative Bachus stated, “I would say notice . . . would probably have a tendency 
always to jeopardize an ongoing investigation . . . .  I would think any time you give a notice, you’re 
interfering with law enforcement activities.”  Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001).  Senator Feingold worried that the 
standard could be met in almost any criminal investigation: “The longstanding practice under the 
fourth amendment of serving a warrant prior to executing a search could be easily avoided in 
virtually every case, because the government would simply have to show that it had ‘reasonable 
cause to believe’ that providing notice ‘may’ seriously jeopardize an investigation.”  147 CONG. 
REC. 20,702 (2001). 
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“[W]hat [Senator Feingold] called a ‘sneak and peek’ search warrant, these 
warrants are already used throughout the United States, throughout our 
whole country.  The bill simply codifies and clarifies the practice . . . .”114  
Senator Hatch deemed the practice “totally constitutional.”115  He further 
claimed the practice had been upheld as constitutional “from the beginning 
of this country.”116  Senator Hatch did not provide any authority for his claim 
that delayed notice search warrants have been permissible since the early 
years of the republic, or any time before the 1980s—and, as explained in 
Part III.A, no such evidence exists. 
Support for the bill as a whole overwhelmed this limited opposition, and 
the USA Patriot Act, including section 213, passed the House on October 24, 
2001, by a vote of 356–66, and passed the Senate on October 25, 2001, by a 
vote of 98–1.117  President Bush signed the bill into law on October 26, 
2001.118 
In the debate surrounding the re-authorization of the USA Patriot Act in 
2005, the Department of Justice prepared a “white paper” defending the 
constitutionality of delayed notice search warrants under § 3103a, calling 
them a “Time-Honored Tool for Fighting Crime.”119  Like many courts, the 
DOJ white paper relied on circuit cases such as Freitas and Villegas, as well 
as the Supreme Court’s decision in Dalia, to argue that delayed notice 
warrants raised no serious Fourth Amendment issues.120  The DOJ did not 
cite Wilson v. Arkansas, or mention the common law notice requirement.121 
Parts of the Patriot Act were subject to a “sunset” provision—they 
expired automatically in 2005 and required new legislation to stay in 
effect.122  Section 213, the delayed notice search warrant provision, was not 
subject to the sunset.123  In 2003, Senator Feingold introduced a bill seeking 
 
 114.  147 CONG. REC. 20,704 (2001). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Kerr, supra note 98, at 607 n.1. 
 118.  See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; Kerr, supra note 98, at 607 n.1. 
 119.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DELAYED NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS: A VITAL AND TIME-
HONORED TOOL FOR FIGHTING CRIME (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/ 
patriotact213report.pdf. 
 120.  Id. at 2–3. 
 121.  See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 122.  USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001) (“[T]his title 
and the amendments made by this title . . . shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.”). 
 123.  Id. 
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to amend section 213 in several respects—to eliminate the “catch-all” 
exception in § 3103a(E), to make section 213 subject to the sunset provision, 
to shorten the notice period to seven days, and to require a public report on 
the number of times delayed notice search warrants were used.124  His bill 
did not become law, but Senator Feingold re-introduced it in 2005 during the 
debate over re-authorization of the Patriot Act.125   
Not all of Senator Feingold’s revisions carried the day, but the one 
provision that did become law was the reporting requirement.  Senator 
Feingold explained it as follows:    
[T]he bill requires a public report on the number of times that 
section 213 is used, the number of times that extensions are sought 
beyond the 7-day notice period, and the type of crimes being 
investigated with this power. This information will help the public 
and Congress evaluate the need for this authority and determine 
whether it should be retained or modified after the sunset.126 
This reporting requirement was included in the final bill and became law.127 
Accordingly, since 2006, the delayed notice search warrant statute has 
contained a reporting requirement.128  Within thirty days of the “expiration of 
a warrant authorizing delayed notice . . . entered under this section, . . . the 
issuing or denying judge shall report” several things to the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts.129  Specifically, the judge must report that the 
warrant was applied for; whether it was granted, modified, or denied; the 
period of delay, including extensions; and the offense specified in the 
warrant.130  The Administrative Office, in turn, is commanded to transmit to 
Congress an annual report summarizing this data.131  Accordingly, starting in 
fiscal year 2007, the Administrative Office has published an annual report 
on delayed notice search warrants authorized under § 3103a (hereinafter, 
 
 124.  149 CONG. REC. S12,377–87 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003).  See Reasonable Notice and Search 
Act, S. 1701, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 125.   151 CONG. REC. S1130–34 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005).  See Reasonable Notice and Search Act, 
S. 316, 110th Cong. (2005). 
 126.  151 CONG. REC. S1130–34 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005). 
 127.  USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. Conf. Rep. 109-
333, 109th Cong. § 114 (2005), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 184. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(d)(1) (2012). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. § 3103a(d)(2). 
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“Delayed Notice Reports”).  The purpose of these reports, Senator Feingold 
explained, is to “help the public and Congress evaluate the need for this 
authority and determine whether it should be retained or modified.”132 
B.  The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Search Warrants, and the Broken 
Reporting Requirement  
In the decade following congressional authorization of covert searches 
in 2001, the use of federal delayed notice search warrants has exploded, 
from less than 100 per year in 2002 to 5601 in 2012.133  Just in the past six 
years, the rise is an incredible three thousand percent (from 174 in 2006 to 
5601 in 2012).134 
This data is alarming, but there is good reason to think it is misleading.  
Rather than showing a dramatic increase in the use of “sneak and peek” 
searches, the data may simply reflect a coincidental shift in the use of 
warrants for searches that used to be conducted without warrants: covert cell 
phone location tracking, covert GPS tracking, and covert searching of e-mail 
messages, among other things.  Fundamentally, the data does not allow us to 
disentangle these effects, and thus the data is not much use in its current 
form.  In particular, the data does not tell Congress, or the public, how often 
investigators are conducting covert searches of homes and businesses—
precisely what Congress sought to track when it passed the reporting 
requirement in 2005.135  In short, the reporting requirement is broken, and it 
should be fixed. 
Part I.B.1 examines the available data, showing a dramatic rise in 
federal delayed notice search warrants.  Part I.B.2 explains why this data is 
misleading, in light of several other trends in search warrant use.  Part I.B.3 
argues that Congress (by statute) or the Administrative Office of the United 
 
 132.  151 CONG. REC. S1131 (2005). 
 133.  See infra Figure 1. 
 134.  See infra Figure 1. 
 135.  See generally USA PATRIOT Reauthorization and Improvement Act § 114(c).  The Act 
imposes notification and reporting requirements on judges who sanction delayed notice search 
warrants.  When originally passed, section 213 lacked a reporting requirement, but a judge is now 
required to report to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts within thirty days after the 
expiration of a delayed notice warrant: (1) the fact that a warrant was applied for; (2) that the warrant 
or extension was granted, denied, or modified; (3) the term of delay in giving the notice permitted by 
the warrant and the number and duration of any extensions; and (4) the offense specified in the 
warrant.  Id.  The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts must then supply details to Congress 
summarizing the data provided by federal judges.  Id. 
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States Courts (by regulation) should fix the reporting requirement so that the 
data can do what was intended—”help the public and Congress evaluate the 
need for this authority and determine whether it should be retained or 
modified.”136  
1.  The Dramatic Rise in Federal Delayed Notice Search Warrants 
When Congress enacted § 3103a there were likely less than one hundred 
“sneak and peek” searches conducted in the United States per year.  There is 
no firm data before 2001, but the practice was rare. Delayed notice search 
warrants were first discussed in the Freitas decision in 1985,137 and from 
then until 2001 they appeared in only a handful of state and federal cases.138  
After Congress passed § 3103a, the practice remained relatively rare for a 
few years.  The best available data for those years—an approximation based 
on internal DOJ surveys—suggests that fewer than 100 delayed notice 
search warrants were issued each year between 2002 and 2005.139  In 2006 
that number rose to 174, and by 2012 federal courts issued 5601 delayed 
notice search warrants—an increase of over 3000% over five years.140  
Figure 1 shows the increase over time in the use of federal delayed notice 
search warrants.141   
 
 136.  151 CONG. REC. S1117-01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
 137.  United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
 138.  Delayed notice search warrants are mentioned (sometimes only in passing) in the following 
cases decided before enactment of § 3103a: United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1984); United 
States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 
1990); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Chimera, 201 
F.R.D. 72 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tex. 1995); People v. 
Ceja, Nos. H021664, H021697, 2001 WL 1246632 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2001). 
 139.  In the lead up to the 2005 PATRIOT Act Re-Authorization, the Department of Justice 
prepared a report for Congress on the use of delayed notice search warrants up to that time.  Some 
details of that report were included in a report by Representative Sensenbrenner.  H.R. REP. NO. 
109-174(I), at 23 (2005).  That report stated that there were sixty-one delayed notice search warrants 
between April 2003 and July 2004, and 155 delayed notice search warrants between October 26, 
2001 and January 31, 2005.  Id. 
 140.  See infra Figure 1. 
 141.  All of the data in Figure 1 is based on the federal fiscal year, not the calendar year, as that is 
the format used to report data by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  Judicial Facts and 
Figures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2013).  Figure 1 shows the number of delayed notice search warrants granted, not the 
number requested.  It also does not include the number of extensions of existing delayed notice 
search warrants granted each year.  The figures for 2002–2006 are estimates based on internal DOJ 
surveys.  See H.R. REP. NO. 109-174, pt. 1, at 23 (2005).  From this DOJ report, it can be inferred 
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that forty-seven delayed notice search warrants were reported from the passage of the PATRIOT 
Act—October 26, 2001—through March 31, 2003.  Id. at 463.  Thus, over this seventeen-month 
period, forty-seven delayed-notice search warrants were issued.  Id.  The data for fiscal year 2004 
are based on a survey of U.S. Attorney’s Offices covering April 2003 through July 2004.  Id at 23.  
During that time, the report stated that sixty-one search warrants “had delayed notice.”  Id.  The data 
for fiscal year 2005 is an estimate based on the following: From the DOJ report, it can be calculated 
that from August 2004 through January 31, 2005, forty-seven delayed-notice search warrants were 
issued.  Id.  Doubling that six-month number gives an estimated ninety-four delayed notice search 
warrants in fiscal year 2005.  Data for fiscal year 2006 is based on a summary contained in the first 
report from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE 
SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS (2008), available at http://irregulartimes.com/images/ 
AOUSCfiscal2007.pdf.  That report contained data from March 2006 through September 2006, and 
lists eighty-seven delayed notice search warrants.  Id. at 5 tbl. 1a (fiscal year 2006: warrants granted 
(75) and granted as modified (12)).  Doubling that number to estimate the twelve-month period 
produces the figure of 174 delayed-notice searches for 2006. 
  The numbers for fiscal years 2007–2012 are taken from the Administrative Office annual 
reports to Congress for each of those years.  See id. at 3 tbl.1 (fiscal year 2007: warrants granted 
(404) and granted as modified (15)); REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND 
EXTENSIONS 3 tbl.1 (2009) (fiscal year 2008: warrants granted (737) and granted as modified (23)), 
available at http://irregulartimes.com/images/AOUSCfiscal2008.pdf; REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-
NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS 3 tbl.1 (2010) (fiscal year 2009: warrants granted 
(1124) and granted as modified (21)), available at http://irregulartimes.com/images/ 
AOUSCfiscal2009.pdf; REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS 3 
tbl.1 (2011) (fiscal year 2010: warrants granted (2356) and granted as modified (23)), available at 
http://irregulartimes.com/images/AOUSCfiscal2010.pdf; REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE 
SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS 3 tbl.1 (2012) (fiscal year 2011: warrants granted (3698) and 
granted as modified (35)); REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND 
EXTENSIONS 3 tbl.1 (2013) (fiscal year 2012: warrants granted (5559) and granted as modified (42)). 
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Requests for delayed notice search warrants are almost never denied: 
from 2006 to 2012, investigators have requested 14,216 delayed notice 
search warrants, and courts have denied these applications thirty-nine 
times—less than 0.3% of all applications.142  In 2012, investigators applied 
for 5606 delayed notice search warrants and 4577 extensions of existing 
delayed notice warrants; of those over 10,000 applications, a total of ten 
were denied. 
The data also shows that most delayed notice search warrants—about 
75%—are obtained for drug investigations.143  The next most common uses 
are for extortion, fraud, weapons offenses, and fugitive investigations, each 
representing approximately 3%–7% of delayed notice search warrants in a 
given year.144  Only a tiny fraction of delayed notice search warrants—
142. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
143.  From fiscal year 2006 through 2012, the percentages of all delayed-notice warrants that were 
requested for drug investigations are as follows: 75% (2006); 72% (2007); 62% (2008); 74% (2009); 
74% (2010); 72% (2011); 82% (2012).  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
144.  For example, in 2010, delayed-notice warrants were used 79 times in extortion cases (3.3%), 
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usually less than 1% per year—is used in terrorism cases.145  Figure 2 shows 
the number of delayed notice search warrants from 2006 to 2012 (the years 
for which this data is available), by type of criminal investigation.146
Specific numbers are provided on the chart for drug investigations and 
terrorism investigations.147 
90 times in fraud cases (3.8%), 47 times in fugitive cases (2%), and 49 times in weapons cases 
(2.1%).  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
145. From fiscal year 2006 through 2012, the percentage of all delayed-notice warrants that were 
requested for terrorism investigations is as follows: 0% (2006); 1.4% (2007); 0.4 percent (2008); 
0.5% (2009); 0.9% (2010); 0.3% (2011); 0.6% (2012).  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
146. See infra Figure 2. 
147.  Data for Figure 2 comes from the annual reports on delayed-notice warrants.  See supra note 
141 and accompanying text.  
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Figure 3 shows the break-down for fiscal year 2010, by type of case, in 
pie chart form. 
 
Even when there is agreement that some sort of delay in notice may be 
appropriate, courts and legislators have debated how long notice should be 
delayed.148  At the short end, some have argued that delay should not 
ordinarily exceed seven days, subject to extension in exceptional cases.149  
The Department of Justice initially sought authorization for a ninety-day 
delay, subject to extension.150  Congress refused to provide “a blanket 
 
 148.  See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
 149.  See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (“We . . . agree with 
the Freitas court that as an initial matter, the issuing court should not authorize a notice delay of 
longer than seven days.  For good cause, the issuing court may thereafter extend the period of 
delay.”); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (delay “should not exceed 
seven days except upon a strong showing of necessity”); S. REP. NO. 111-92, at 4 (2009) (The USA 
Patriot Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009) (proposing an amendment to “to modify the presumptive 
time period for delayed notice search warrant from 30 days, which is the period under current law, to 
seven days,” which did not become law); 147 CONG. REC. S10557 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(“I would expect courts to be guided by the teachings of the Second and the Ninth Circuits that, in 
the ordinary case, a reasonable time is no more than seven days.”).   
 150.  Section 352 of the administration’s first proposal would have authorized delay “pursuant to 
Drugs 
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authorization for up to a 90-day delay,” instead amending the language to 
require “that notice be given within a reasonable time of the execution of the 
warrant.”151  Senator Leahy stated his (optimistic) expectation for “courts to 
be guided by the teachings of the Second and the Ninth Circuits that, in the 
ordinary case, a reasonable time is no more than seven days.”152   
In 2005, Congress changed the standard delay to a period not to exceed 
thirty days, subject to extension.153  In another Patriot Act reauthorization in 
2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a bill that “shorten[ed] the 
presumptive time period for delayed notice from 30 days to 7 days,” noting 
that the Delayed Notice Reports showed “that these so-called ‘sneak and 
peek’ warrants are only very rarely used in terrorism cases.”154  That 
amendment failed to carry the day, however, and the reauthorization that 
passed did not modify the thirty-day notification default, which remains the 
law today.155 
Statistics show that substantial extensions of the thirty-day delay period 
are the rule, not the exception.156  In fact, of all delayed notice search 
warrants, notice is given in thirty days (or less) only about one-third of the 
time.157  While the DOJ failed to persuade Congress to make a ninety-day 
delay the statutory norm, a ninety-day delay has nevertheless become the 
 
the standards, terms, and conditions set forth in section 2705 [of the Stored Communications Act], 
unless otherwise expressly provided by statute.”  Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 44 (2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Section 2705 provided (and still provides) for a ninety-day delay for orders issued under 
the Stored Communications Act, subject to extension.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012). 
 151.  147 CONG. REC. 19,502 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  Senator Leahy stated that the 
administration’s proposal “would have extended the permissible period of delay to a maximum of 90 
days, instead of the presumptive seven-day period provided by the caselaw on sneak and peek 
warrants,” and explained that the revised provision “now requires that notice be given within a 
reasonable time of the execution of the warrant rather than giving a blanket authorization for up to a 
90-day delay.”  Id.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (2012) (providing for notice to be delayed for 
“a reasonable period”). 
 152.  147 CONG. REC. 19,502 (2001).   
 153.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3). 
 154.  S. REP. NO. 111-92 (2009). 
 155.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3). 
 156.  See supra note 141 (listing the number of modified warrants granted for each fiscal year 
between 2007 and 2012). 
 157.  The total number of delayed notice search warrants and warrant extensions between fiscal 
years 2007 and 2012—the years for which this data is available—is 24,808.  Of those, notification 
was given within thirty days (or less) in approximately 8,500 cases, or 34% of the time.  These 
figures are compiled from the delayed notice search warrant reports from 2007–2012.  See supra 
note 141.  
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norm in practice.  About half of all delayed notice search warrants involve 
ninety-day delays.158  A minority of cases, but still a substantial number, 
involve delays of six months or more.159  In 2007, for example, there were 
about fifty instances of delays of 180 days or more.160  In all, more than half 
of all delayed notice search warrants involve notice given ninety days or 
more after the search.161  Delays range from one day up to 455 days.162   
Table 1 shows the average delay per fiscal year as well as the median 
delay—which in each year is ninety days, and represents very close to half 
of all delayed notice warrants.163  Table 1 also shows the range of delays 
from that year, from lowest to highest. 
Table 1 
Fiscal 
Year 
Average Delay 
(Days) 
Median Delay 
(Days)164 
Range of Delays 
(Days) 
2006165 67 n/a n/a 
2007 75 90 (47% of cases) 5–365 
2008 68 90 (46% of cases) 3–365 
2009 64 90 (47% of cases) 7–300 
2010 65 90 (51% of cases) 1–455 
2011 66 90 (51% of cases) 1–366 
2012 65 90 (50% of cases) 1–365 
 
 
 158.  The data on this point are remarkably stable from 2006 through 2012, varying only between 
46% and 51%.  See supra note 141. 
 159.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See supra note 141. 
 161.  See supra note 141. 
 162.  See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND EXTENSIONS (2011), 
supra note 141. 
 163.  See supra note 141. 
 164.  The report calls this the “most frequently reported period of delay.”  See supra note 141. 
 165.  The data for fiscal year 2006 is estimated.  See supra note 141. 
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In summary, the available data shows a rapid explosion in the use of 
federal delayed notice search warrants, used mostly in drug cases and only 
rarely in terrorism cases, and with lengthy delays in giving notice.  Part I.B.2 
now turns to cast a questioning eye on what these figures truly represent. 
2.  The Broken Reporting Requirement 
Congress was focused on covert searches of physical spaces when it 
passed § 3103a and the corresponding reporting requirement.166  When 
Congress passed the reporting requirement in § 3103a(d), Congress expected 
to receive data showing how often investigators were covertly entering 
people’s homes and businesses.  Instead, Congress is receiving data showing 
how often investigators get authority to delay notice on many different types 
of warrants, including many that do not involve covertly entering any 
physical space, such as cell phone location tracking, GPS tracking, and 
searching e-mails.167  There are good reasons to be concerned about the 
privacy implications of all of these types of covert surveillance, yet the 
privacy concerns in each type of search are somewhat different.  Moreover, 
the use of these various types of searches is evolving rapidly—and in 
different ways, depending on the type of search—and thus a single report 
lumping all of these types of searches together is of little use.  Finally, as 
explained below, the data does not even reliably show whether there is an 
overall increase in these various types of covert searches (even though there 
likely is such an increase).  In short, the reporting requirement is broken—it 
is not giving us the data Congress or the public needs—and should be fixed.   
Section 3103a(b) is framed in general terms: for any “warrant . . . under 
this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize any property or 
material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the 
laws of the United States, any notice required, or that may be required, to be 
given may be delayed” in the circumstances set forth.168  The reporting 
requirement is similarly general: soon after “the expiration of a warrant 
authorizing delayed notice . . . entered under this section, . . . the issuing or 
denying judge shall report” various types of information about the 
 
 166.  See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text (discussing the use of search warrants for cell 
phone data). 
 168.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (2012). 
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warrant.169  Neither the statutory authority for delayed notice warrants nor 
the reporting requirements are limited to particular types of searches.170  In 
particular, they are not limited to physical invasions of homes or businesses, 
but apply to any type of warrant to search for and seize evidence of a 
crime.171 
Congressional discussions of delayed notice search warrants—both 
criticisms and defenses—focused on physical searches of homes and 
businesses.172  Congressional testimony, by officials from the DOJ and 
others, likewise focused on physical searches of spaces or packages.173  
 
 169.  Id. § 3103a(d)(1). 
 170.  See id. §3103a.   
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See, e.g., Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 73–74 (2001) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div.) (“I can tell you from my own personal experience that there are 
circumstances in which you need to be able to go into a location and search . . . [b]ut you cannot give 
notice or wind up alerting people who may be very dangerous”); id. (statement of Rep. Spencer 
Bachus) (“you’re applying this [delayed notice] to all cases where you want to search someone’s 
home”); 147 CONG. REC. 19,502 (2001) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“Normally, when law 
enforcement officers execute a search warrant, they must leave a copy of the warrant and a receipt 
for all property seized at the premises searched.  Thus, even if the search occurs when the owner of 
the premises is not present, the owner will receive notice that the premises have been lawfully 
searched pursuant to a warrant rather than, for example, burglarized.”); 147 CONG. REC. 20,702 
(2001) (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold) (“Notice is a key element of fourth amendment 
protections. . . . If . . . the police have received permission to do a ‘sneak and peek’ search, they can 
come in your house, look around, and leave, and may never have to tell you that ever happened.  
That bothers me.  I bet it bothers most Americans.”). 
 173.  See, e.g., Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 26 (2001) (statement of Jerry Berman, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for 
Democracy and Tech.) (characterizing the delayed notice search warrant provisions as “[a]llow[ing] 
secret searches of homes and offices”); Letter to the House Urging Them to Vote “No” on the 
PATRIOT Act, ACLU (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/letter-house-urging-
them-vote-no-patriot-act (“Sneak and Peek Searches: this section authorizes the wholesale use of 
covert searches for any criminal investigation thus allowing the government to enter your home, 
office or other private place and conduct a search, take photographs, and download your computer 
files without notifying you until later.”); A Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Proposals: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 14 (2004) (statement of Hon. James 
Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (defending delayed notice search warrants and 
giving examples of successful uses of this authority; examples given were opening an envelope with 
a delayed notice search warrant, and breaking into a car to seize drugs); Implementation of the USA 
PATRIOT Act: Sections 201, 202, 223 of the Act That Addresses Criminal Wiretaps, and Section 213 
of the Act That Addresses Delayed Notice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (statement of Chuck 
Rosenberg, Chief of Staff to Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (giving examples of 
successful uses of delayed notice search warrants; example given was opening a Fed Ex package); 
Patriot Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13 (2005) 
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There is no mention, in any of the discussion of § 3103a, that this general 
authority would also apply to search warrants that did not involve physical 
intrusions into homes, businesses, and packages.  All of this is not to suggest 
that § 3103a was implicitly limited to physical intrusions—by its terms, it is 
not174—but to show that Congress was focused on the paradigmatic case of a 
delayed notice search warrant, namely a covert physical invasion of homes 
and businesses.  This focus continued through debates, in later years, over 
re-authorization.  As recently as 2011, a congressional report characterized 
“delayed notice search warrants” as involving covert searches of homes and 
businesses.175 
As noted earlier, Congress in 2005 passed a reporting requirement 
designed to produce annual data on the use of § 3103a.176  In the words of 
Senator Feingold, this reporting requirement and the data it would produce 
were intended to “help the public and Congress evaluate the need for this 
authority and determine whether it should be retained or modified.”177  Given 
Congress’s focus on covert entry into physical spaces, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the reporting requirement in § 3103a(d) was primarily 
intended to monitor covert searches of homes and businesses. 
As of 2006, when the Administrative Office began compiling the 
Delayed Notice Reports, there is good reason to believe that the reported 
data indeed captured the number of “sneak and peek” searches.  The AO 
reported eighty-seven delayed notice search warrants for March through 
September 2006, or approximately 174 delayed notice search warrants in a 
year.178  That number is higher than figures given by DOJ officials for earlier 
years—reports suggested around sixty-one for 2004 and ninety-four for 
2005179—but not dramatically higher.  By fiscal year 2007, the number was 
 
(statement of James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (example given was 
conducting covert searches of drug “stash houses”). 
 174.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a; see also supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text (stating that the 
text of the statute does not define which searches are eligible for delayed notice). 
 175.  S. REP. NO. 112-13, at 15 (2011) (“Section 213 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act authorized 
the use of delayed notice, or ‘sneak and peek,’ search warrants in criminal cases.  These warrants 
allow law enforcement agents to enter and search an American’s home or business, but not notify the 
owner until weeks or even months later.”). 
 176.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 177.  151 CONG. REC. S1131 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005). 
 178.  See supra Figure 1; supra note 141. 
 179.  See supra Figure 1; supra note 141. 
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on the rise, up to 419, and the rise has continued rapidly.180 
In the past few years, several changes have occurred in the use of search 
warrants with delayed notice—changes that were largely unrelated to the 
passage of § 3103a, but which have likely impacted this data.181  These 
developments involve changes in the use of search warrants to conduct 
various types of searches, all involving new electronic technologies: tracking 
a person’s location using cell phone location information, searching the 
contents of e-mail messages, and using GPS tracking devices, among other 
things.  There is good reason to believe that at least in the past few years, 
and possibly earlier, some substantial portion of federal delayed notice 
search warrants involve these types of searches, rather than covert searches 
of physical space. 
Cell Phone Location Information.  Investigators in recent years have 
increasingly used a variety of technological approaches to track the location 
of individuals through their cell phones, almost always covertly.182  Police 
can track a person through cell site location information (CSLI), which 
shows the location of a phone within a given area by identifying which cell 
tower a user’s cell phone was communicating with at the time of a call.183  
Police can obtain historical CSLI from cell phone providers to show past 
locations, or can obtain prospective CLSI that enables them to track the 
location of a cell phone in real time.184  Police can also use GPS devices, 
now a standard feature in most mobile phones, to track a user’s location.185  
Police can obtain GPS information from cell phone service providers, from 
third-party apps, or by covertly “pinging” a user’s phone to determine the 
location, even when a call is not being made.  Police may also determine a 
user’s location through business records showing which wireless internet 
connections a phone was connected with and when those connections 
 
 180.  See 2008 REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR DELAYED-NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS AND 
EXTENSIONS, supra note 141. 
 181.  Thanks to Professor Orin Kerr for raising this issue and bringing some of these 
developments—and their potential impact on the data—to my attention. 
 182.  See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable 
Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 117, 120 (2012); Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment 
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2012). 
 183.  Rothstein, supra note 182, at 494. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 493. 
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occurred.186 
The volume of cell phone location tracking is huge, with one federal 
judge estimating in 2011 that “federal courts alone approve 20,000–30,000 
tracking requests annually, and the number is rising.”187  These different cell 
phone tracking technologies are governed by a variety of different legal 
regimes, and there is considerable uncertainty about which legal regimes 
govern which types of tracking.188  In many cases, investigators have been 
able to covertly track cell phone locations without using a search warrant, 
for example through court orders under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (the Stored 
Communications Act) or pen/trap orders under 18 U.S.C. § 3123.189 
In recent years, a number of federal magistrate judges have begun 
demanding that police obtain search warrants for various categories of cell 
phone tracking data, while other courts continue to permit investigators to 
use less stringent forms of statutory authority.190  Amidst this uncertainty, it 
is clear that investigators are increasingly (though not uniformly) using 
Fourth Amendment search warrants to conduct various kinds of cell phone 
location tracking, and that those warrants are always delayed notice 
 
 186.  Pell & Soghoian, supra note 182, at 126–32; Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and 
the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702–16 (2011) (detailing 
the richness and precision of various types of cell phone location data). 
 187.  Rothstein, supra note 182, at 491 (footnotes omitted) (citing Julia Angwin & Scott Thurm, 
Judges Weigh Phone Tracking, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2011, at A1) (“Police track thousands of cell 
phones every year.  Generally, neither the target nor the public ever learns of a tracking order.  
Requests to track cell phones are sealed, and the judges who consider them seldom publish 
opinions.”).  See also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 182, at 121 (“[Requests for] location information 
grew ‘exponentially’ over the past few years, with major wireless carriers now receiving thousands 
of requests per month.  Sprint Nextel received so many requests that it developed a web interface 
that gave law enforcement direct access to its subscribers’ location data.  Law enforcement agents 
used the website to ‘ping’ Sprint subscribers over eight million times in a single year.”).   
 188.  Pell & Soghoian, supra note 182, at 126–32; Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and 
the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 (2011). 
 189.  Pell & Soghoian, supra note 182, at 133–50. 
 190.  See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 182, at 137–38; Freiwald, supra note 186, at 683–84 
(noting that the Third Circuit in 2010 “held that magistrate judges retain the option to impose a 
warrant requirement on government agents who seek location data or may instead permit them to 
satisfy the less demanding statutory standard before obtaining an order compelling disclosure”); In 
re Application of U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Comm. Service to Disclose Records, 
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing cases holding that the government must use search warrants to 
obtain various types of cell phone location data, and cases holding to the contrary); In re Application 
of U.S. for Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), C.R. No. C-13-497M, 2013 WL 1934491 (S.D. 
Tex. May 8, 2013) (holding that government was required to show probable cause to obtain 
historical cell site information; citing cases holding that probable cause and the Fourth Amendment 
do not apply to historical cell site data, and cases holding the contrary). 
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warrants.191  Some courts have been requiring search warrants for at least 
some types of cell phone location data (such as prospective, real-time 
tracking) since at least 2005.192 
To the extent investigators engage in covert cell phone location tracking 
using statutory orders that are not search warrants, that practice will not be 
reported in the Delayed Notice Reports (which reports on “warrants” issued 
under § 3103a).  But to the extent investigators conduct the exact same 
covert tracking using search warrants, that tracking will be reported in the 
Delayed Notice Reports.  It is impossible to determine precisely what 
percentage of the delayed notice search warrants in the covered years (2006–
2012) are warrants for cell phone location tracking.  Some investigators 
likely continue to perform this tracking without using reported search 
warrants.193  But given the judicial pressure to use search warrants, it is quite 
likely that investigators are increasingly using reported search warrants to 
conduct cell phone location tracking.194  This shift—from conducting covert 
cell location tracking searches with court orders, to conducting that same 
covert tracking with delayed notice search warrants—would result in a 
steady increase in the reported number of “delayed notice search warrants” 
in the Delayed Notice Reports.  This increase would appear even if the total 
number of covert cell phone location tracking remained constant. 
E-mail messages.  A similar trend may be occurring with covert 
searches of e-mail messages, although the time frame here is somewhat 
more recent.  At least since 2010, however, and arguably since 2007 or 
earlier, investigators have been under increasing pressure to use delayed 
notice search warrants (reported in the Delayed Notice Reports) for any 
 
 191.  See Freiwald, supra note 186, at 729. 
 192.  See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Order, Case Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 
1876847 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006) (requesting an order “(1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a 
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber & Other 
Information; & (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Services”); In re Application for 
Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005); In re Application of 
U.S. for Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (requesting an order “(1) Authorizing the 
Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber 
Information and/or Cell Site Information).  Other courts during this same time have permitted access 
to this same data through less stringent statutory authority rather than Fourth Amendment search 
warrants.  See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info., 460 
F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Application of U.S. for Disclosure of Telecomm. 
Records, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 193.  See Freiwald, supra note 186, at 722. 
 194.  See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 182, at 161–62. 
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covert searching of e-mail messages, instead of using other (unreported) 
legal mechanisms to do so.195 
Access to e-mail messages is governed by the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA), passed by Congress in 1986.196  Under the SCA, investigators 
can obtain e-mail messages in several ways, some of which do not require a 
search warrant.  Depending on the circumstances, investigators can obtain e-
mail messages by using a subpoena, with a court order under § 2703(d), or 
with a search warrant.197  In some cases, investigators want to access e-mail 
records without notifying the owner of the account, and the SCA expressly 
authorizes that practice in specified circumstances.198  Indeed, recall that it is 
precisely this list, from the SCA, that Congress chose to cross-reference in 
section 3103a for delayed notice search warrants.199 
In short, investigators in past years have been able to obtain e-mail 
messages without using search warrants (at least in some circumstances), 
and often have been able to obtain those e-mails covertly, without giving 
notice to the account holder until some later date.200  These covert e-mail 
searches—if conducted without search warrants—would not have been 
reported in the annual Delayed Notice Reports. 
In the past few years, court decisions may be prompting investigators to 
conduct these same searches using search warrants with delayed notice 
under § 3103a.  These searches would be included in the Delayed Notice 
Reports, as they fall under the reporting definition. 
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit adopted a novel interpretation of the 
 
 195.  See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1218–20 (2004). 
 196.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2012). 
 197.  For e-mail messages that have been stored for 180 days or less by a provider of “electronic 
communication service” (ECS), investigators must use a traditional search warrant.  Id. § 2703(a).  
The required notice, however, need only be given to the Internet Service Provider, not the individual 
e-mail account holder.  See In re Application of U.S. for Search Warrant of Elec. Mail, 665 F. Supp. 
2d 1210 (D. Or. 2009).  For e-mail messages that have been stored by an ECS for more than 180 
days, or for any message stored by a provider of remote computing service (RCS), the government 
has several options.  First, it can access e-mail messages by subpoena—in which case it must give 
contemporaneous notice to the subscriber.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).  Second, it can access e-mail 
messages with a court order.  Id. § 2703(d).  This court order is not a traditional search warrant, and 
issuance is not (under the statute) subject to the same requirements as a warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Kerr, supra note 195, at 1218–24. 
 198.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2705; Kerr, supra note 195, at 1218–19. 
 199.  See infra Part II.A. 
 200.  See Kerr, supra note 195, at 1214, 1223. 
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difference, under the SCA, between an “electronic communication service” 
and a “remote computing service.”201  One implication of the decision was to 
require the government—at least in the Ninth Circuit—to obtain warrants for 
a much larger category of e-mails.202  The impact of Theofel v. Farey-Jones 
was likely limited to the Ninth Circuit, however, as other courts have not 
adopted Theofel’s analysis.203  
More significant developments have occurred in the Sixth Circuit, 
which squarely held that individual e-mail account holders have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in the contents of e-mails (even stored 
on public internet service providers), and that those e-mails are thus 
protected under the Fourth Amendment.204  As a result, the court explained, 
those portions of the SCA permitting investigators to access e-mails without 
a search warrant are unconstitutional.205   
A panel of the Sixth Circuit first announced this holding in June of 
2007, although that decision was vacated soon thereafter on the grounds that 
the issue was not yet ripe for adjudication.206  After further developments in 
the litigation, the issue did become ripe, and a Sixth Circuit panel in 
December 2010 again held that “a subscriber enjoys a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of emails” stored with an internet 
service provider, that the government must obtain “a warrant based on 
probable cause” to access these e-mails, and that “to the extent that the SCA 
purports to permit the government to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the 
SCA is unconstitutional.”207   
This decision means that in the Sixth Circuit, since December 2010, 
investigators must use search warrants to obtain e-mail messages.208  And if 
they want to do so covertly, with notice given later, they must get 
 
 201.  Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 202.  See In re Application of U.S. for Search Warrant of Elec. Mail and Order to Not Disclose 
Warrant, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 n.1 (D. Or. 2009) (explaining the impact of Theofel).  See also 
Kerr, supra note 195, at 1217–18, 1224. 
 203.  See United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (rejecting Theofel); 
Lazette v. Kulmatycki, Case No. 3:12CV2416, 2013 WL 2455937, at *7 n.13 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 
2013) (same).  See also Kerr, User’s Guide, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 1217–18, 1224 (criticizing 
Theofel).  
 204.  Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 475 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Warshak v. United States (Warshak II), 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding the 
issue decided in Warshak I was not ripe for adjudication). 
 207.  United States v. Warshak (Warshak III), 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).   
 208.  Id. 
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authorization under § 3103a rather than merely § 2705.209  And that means, 
finally, that all covert e-mail searches in the Sixth Circuit are now being 
reported in the Delayed Notice Reports, whereas in earlier years many such 
covert searches were not being reported.  Investigators in other jurisdictions 
may also be relying increasingly on search warrants to obtain e-mails, out of 
abundance of caution or in anticipation that additional courts may follow the 
Sixth Circuit’s approach.  It is hard to tell whether and to what degree this is 
occurring.   
GPS Tracking.  The data in the Delayed Notice Reports is also likely 
being impacted by the quite recent increase in the use of search warrants to 
conduct GPS tracking.  For many years, police have conducted GPS tracking 
of cars or packages, first with small beepers and later with small GPS 
devices.210  So long as the tracking occurred outside of homes or businesses, 
the tracking was largely done without search warrants (or, indeed, any court 
involvement).211  This type of tracking technology has become cheaper and 
more effective, and has become more and more common.212 
More recently, however, courts have pressured police to use search 
warrants for at least some types of GPS monitoring, in particular long-term 
monitoring.213  To the extent search warrants are used, they are invariably 
delayed notice search warrants—no investigator wants to inform a driver 
that they are about to install a GPS device on his or her car.  In August of 
2010, in United States v. Maynard, the D.C. Circuit held that long-term GPS 
surveillance of car was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, suggesting 
that a search warrant might be required for these searches.214  A week later, 
five judges on the Ninth Circuit, in a dissenting opinion, similarly argued 
that GPS tracking may infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
should be governed by the Fourth Amendment.215   
This question quickly reached the Supreme Court, which held in United 
States v. Jones that long-term GPS monitoring of a car (at least through the 
 
 209.  See Freiwald, supra note 186, at 700. 
 210.  See generally WAYNE LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.7(f) (5th ed. 2013) (discussing the 
use of electronic tracking devices, such as GPS, in criminal investigations). 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  615 F.3d 544, 558–67 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 215.  United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., joined  by 
Reinhardt, Wardlaw, Paez, and Berzon, J.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
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attachment of a GPS device) was a search under the Fourth Amendment.216  
Notably, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended 
in 2006 to authorize (though not require) the use of search warrants to 
conduct tracking (such as with GPS devices).217  Since Jones, in early 2012, 
many investigators are obtaining search warrants—invariably of the delayed 
notice variety—to conduct most GPS tracking. 
The phenomenon of GPS tracking has existed for some time.  When the 
practice was conducted without warrants, however, government GPS 
tracking was not reported on the Delayed Notice Reports.  To the extent that 
investigators now obtain delayed notice search warrants for at least some 
GPS tracking, these searches are beginning to show up in the Delayed 
Notice Reports.  These legal developments in GPS tracking have been quite 
recent (although the Federal Rules change occurred in 2006), so it is difficult 
to say when this would have begun to impact the data. 
* * * 
In light of these developments, it is hard to know what to make of the 
data in the Delayed Notice Reports.  The reporting requirement passed in 
2005 was primarily intended to monitor true “sneak and peek” searches—
covert searches of physical spaces.218  This is the type of search Congress 
was thinking about when it passed § 3103a, and is the only type of delayed 
notice search that legislators have discussed in connection with § 3103a. 
None of this is to say that the public should not be interested in other 
forms of covert searching—such as covert searching of e-mail messages, 
covert GPS tracking, or covert cell phone location tracking.  But there is 
good reason to think that covert searches of physical spaces are uniquely 
invasive to core Fourth Amendment concerns, and require monitoring 
separate from other types of covert searching.   
The problem with the current Delayed Notice Reports is two-fold.  First, 
the reports do not show how frequently investigators are conducting “sneak 
and peek” searches, covert GPS tracking, covert cell phone location 
tracking, or covert e-mail searching, because the data on all of these searches 
are mixed up together.  Second, the reports do not even provide a very good 
picture of “covert searching” overall.  As explained above, many forms of 
covert government surveillance have been, and to varying degrees continue 
 
 216.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 217.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (2010). 
 218.  See 151 CONG. REC. S1131 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005); See also supra Part I.B. 
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to be, conducted without using Fourth Amendment search warrants.219  To 
the extent this is occurring, those searches are not included in the Delayed 
Notice Reports.  The increase in “delayed notice search warrants” in the 
Delayed Notice Reports is in fact, at least in part, caused by the increasing 
Fourth Amendment protections in some areas of covert surveillance.  
Judicial pressure to use search warrants, rather than less stringent court 
orders or no judicial oversight at all, has resulted in searches being included 
in the Delayed Notice Reports when in previous years those same searches 
were not included in those reports. 
Unless the Delayed Notice Reports break down the type of covert search 
being conducted—a physical “sneak and peek,” versus cell phone location 
data, versus covert searching of e-mail messages—the data is serving very 
little purpose. 
3.  Monitoring “Sneak and Peek”: Fixing the Reporting Requirement  
Fortunately, this problem should be relatively easy to fix, and the fix 
could conceivably be done in one of two ways.  First, Congress could amend 
§ 3103a to require that the Delayed Notice Reports include data on the type 
of search for which delayed notice warrants are being used.  Congress might 
specify several possible options from which data reporters may choose: 
searches of physical spaces, searches of physical packages, searches of 
electronic communications, searches for cell phone location information, or 
the use of other tracking devices (such as GPS).   
This same change might be possible even without congressional action, 
through regulations enacted by the Administrative Office.  Section 3103a 
provides that the Director of the Administrative Office, “in consultation with 
the Attorney General, is authorized to issue binding regulations dealing with 
the content and form of the reports required to be filed.”220  Currently the 
Attorney General has not exercised this authority—there are no existing 
regulations governing the content and form of the Delayed Notice Reports.  
Given this authority, the Administrative Authority could adopt regulations 
requiring reporting bodies to include the type of search—along the same 
lines suggested above—in all Delayed Notice Reports. 
This relatively simple amendment—either by statute or regulation—
 
 219.  See supra Part I.A. 
 220.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(d)(3) (2012). 
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would give Congress, and the public, the ability to monitor true “sneak and 
peek” search warrants, as well as the ongoing development and use of other 
forms of covert government surveillance through delayed notice warrants. 
II.  “SNEAK AND PEEK” SEARCHES INVADE CORE PRIVACY INTERESTS 
PROTECTED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
“Sneak and peek” searches raise serious Fourth Amendment issues.  
Covert searches of homes, discussed in Part II.A, invade the privacy and 
repose of the home in ways distinct from the ordinary invasion of a 
traditional search.  Covert seizures, discussed in Part II.B, raise an additional 
set of concerns.  As a matter of first principles, these privacy invasions 
intrude directly on the privacy and sanctity of the home, values that the 
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.  Contrary to the views of many 
courts and commentators, covert searching raises serious constitutional 
questions, not merely possible violations of Rule 41.    
It is notable that during the debate over delayed notice search warrants, 
several legislators squarely asserted that the Fourth Amendment did require 
that notice be given at the time of a search.221  While the supporters of § 
3103a carried the day, no legislators took the floor to disagree with this core 
belief that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires notice of a search.222  
Lower courts, in contrast, mostly hold that notice of a search is only a 
function of Rule 41, not a requirement of the Fourth Amendment.223  For the 
reasons set forth below, the legislators have the better of the constitutional 
argument—the Fourth Amendment does require, at least ordinarily, notice of 
a search. 
A.  Covert Searches Invade the Privacy and Repose of the Home 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that physical invasion into 
the privacy of the home lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Fourth Amendment “unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘[a]t the 
very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into 
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
 
 221.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 222.  Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 223.  See supra note 14 (citing cases). 
[Vol. 41: 509, 2014] The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
551 
intrusion.’”224  The Fourth Amendment rests on the ancient common law 
principle that “the house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress, 
as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.”225 
Of course, the home is not wholly immune from state invasion.  The 
Fourth Amendment permits entry into the homeowner’s “castle and fortress” 
through the instrument of the specific warrant—an authorization to enter a 
specific home based on probable cause to believe that home contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime.226  A covert search conducted under the 
terms of a delayed notice search warrant is done pursuant to a warrant, 
issued by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause to enter the 
specific home in question.  In that sense, then, the invasion into the home is 
accomplished by the means dictated by the Fourth Amendment. 
The covert nature of that intrusion, however, raises additional Fourth 
Amendment privacy concerns apart from the fact of physical intrusion 
(which itself is justified by the warrant).  There are at least two privacy 
intrusions caused by the covert nature of an otherwise-legal search:  (1) the 
distress and loss of privacy experienced when an individual learns the 
government secretly searched through his or her home; and (2) the loss of 
privacy imposed on the entire community when each person, knowing the 
government sometimes secretly searches homes, suffers the uncertainty of 
wondering whether the government has secretly searched his or her home.  
The first interest was recognized by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Frietas: “surreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very 
heart of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment” because “[t]he 
mere thought of strangers walking through and visually examining the center 
of our privacy interest, our home, arouses our passion for freedom as does 
nothing else.”227  On this view, while it is certainly unpleasant to watch 
government officials search your home, it is a separate harm to imagine 
 
 224.  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 225.  Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.).  “The people’s protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure in their ‘houses’ was drawn from the English common-law maxim, 
‘A man’s home is his castle.’”  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (citing Semayne’s Case). 
 226.  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 123 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 
Semayne’s Case) (“At least since 1604 it has been settled that in the absence of exigent 
circumstances, a government agent has no right to enter a ‘house’ or ‘castle’ unless authorized to do 
so by a valid warrant.”). 
 227.  United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).   
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government officials searching your home when you are absent.228  The 
Second Circuit argued in Villegas that a covert search was less intrusive than 
a conventional search and seizure, because a search and seizure “deprives 
the owner not only of privacy but also of the use of his property.”229  But 
even this statement recognizes that a covert search—even with no seizure—
does “deprive[] the owner . . . of privacy.”230  The added observation that a 
seizure represents an additional deprivation is true—but that is true whether 
the search is covert or not.  Moreover, this does not negate the distinct 
privacy invasion of a covert search.   
When the occupant is present during a search, she can at least observe 
what is being done, and what is found.  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require an officer to “prepare and verify and inventory of any 
property seized,” and to do so “in the presence of another officer and the 
person from whom . . . the property was taken.”231  When the search is 
conducted secretly, the occupant can only imagine where the officials 
searched, and what was found.  As early as 1628, Sir Edward Coke warned 
that “if a man’s house could be searched while he was confined without 
being told the cause, ‘they will find cause enough.’”232  A secret search 
invites abuse, such as Coke’s accusation that officials will invent evidence if 
they cannot find it. 
The Fourth Amendment seeks to protect “the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.”233  Individuals suffer a distinct privacy intrusion in knowing that 
the government searched through their homes—their “castle and fortress,” 
“defence against injury and violence,” and place of “repose”234—without 
 
 228.  See Nathan H. Seltzer, When History Matters Not: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of the 
Secret Search, 40 CRIM. LAW BULL., Summer 2004, at *15–16 (2004) (“Certainly the right to be 
secure in one’s home includes the right to oversee the boundaries of a police search, or at the very 
least, to be notified of that search immediately.”). 
 229.  United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).  One later court shortened 
this to the less accurate view that covert searches are “less intrusive than conventional searches.”  
United States v. Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121, 126 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (citing United States v. Pangburn, 
983 F.2d 449, 454–55 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 230.  Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337. 
 231.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B). 
 232.  WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–
1791, at 141 (2009) (citing COMMONS DEBATES 1628, at 159 (Robert C. Johnson et al. eds., 1997)). 
 233.  Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
 234.  Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) 195. 
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their knowledge.235  
A second privacy intrusion of covert searches is the broad, chilling 
effect on the entire community’s sense of privacy in their homes.  Justice 
Sotomayor recently observed that “[a]wareness that the Government may be 
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”236  Covert searching 
is a “known unknown”237—persons in the community know that the police 
have the authority to (and sometimes do) conduct covert searches of homes 
and businesses, and also know that the timing and targets of those searches 
are unknown. 
In this respect, the concern over covert searching overlaps with Fourth 
Amendment concerns over surveillance more broadly—the generalized 
concern of the government gathering information about citizens without 
their knowledge.  The Court has recognized that freedom from government 
surveillance is a fundamental concern of the Fourth Amendment.  In United 
States v. Di Re, the Court explained that “the forefathers, after consulting the 
lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of 
a too permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a 
greater danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from 
punishment.”238  An oft-quoted opinion by Justice Jackson likewise links 
Fourth Amendment privacy to the idea of freedom from surveillance:  “The 
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not 
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable 
security and freedom from surveillance.”239  
The Fourth Amendment has sometimes proved an ineffective restraint 
on government surveillance generally, because much of that surveillance 
increasingly takes place without any physical invasion into the home or 
 
 235.  See Seltzer, supra note 228 (“As a general principle, sneak and peek searches are wholly 
inconsistent with the Framers’ notions of liberty and security.”). 
 236.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 237.  PIECES OF INTELLIGENCE: THE EXISTENTIAL POETRY OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD 2 (Hart 
Seely ed., 2003). 
 238.  United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).  Justice Sotomayor, quoting Di Re, 
recently recognized “the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and 
prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (quoting 
Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595). 
 239.  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (quoted with approval in Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 n.18 (1981); and Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 n.10 (1984)).  
See also United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (“Though 
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance.”). 
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other protected physical space.240  This problem is not present for delayed 
notice search warrants, which introduce covert government surveillance 
directly into the home—an area unquestionably protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.241  Covert searches of homes, then, should be properly 
understood to raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns even under current 
Fourth Amendment doctrines, which sometimes fail to adequately respond 
to other forms of surveillance.242 
As noted above, covert searching unsettles the privacy of the entire 
community in a way that traditional searches do not.243  And the loss of 
privacy felt by the entire community increases dramatically as covert 
searches are used more frequently.244  If covert searches are rare, many 
persons in the community will not even know they occur, and those who do 
know will understand that the likelihood that they have been subjected to a 
covert search is quite small.  The more frequently these covert searches are 
conducted, however, the more reasonable it becomes for each person to 
wonder whether the government has searched their private spaces.245   
Covert searches and surveillance are a favorite tactic of totalitarian 
governments precisely for this reason: the general knowledge in the 
community that one’s home may be secretly searched by the state 
dramatically decreases each person’s sense of privacy, even if that person’s 
home has never been searched.  “[A] totalitarian government engages in 
systematic, often covert surveillance of its populace, ‘penetrating,’ in Mill’s 
words, ever ‘more deeply into the details of life,’ with the object of 
 
 240.  See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (analyzing the failures of traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrines to appropriately limit government surveillance, and proposing substantial 
revisions to Fourth Amendment doctrine to better respond to the privacy threats of government 
surveillance). 
 241.  See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 
642–43 (1999). 
 242.  See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1942–45, 
1953 (2013). 
 243.  See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text. 
 244.  See Richards, supra note 242, at 1936 (“[W]e must recognize that surveillance is harmful.  
Surveillance menaces intellectual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and 
discrimination; accordingly, we must recognize surveillance as a harm in constitutional standing 
doctrine.”). 
 245.  See id. at 1935 (explaining there will be “power dynamic between the watcher and the 
watched”). 
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‘enslaving the soul.’”246  In the words of Professor Neil Richards, “[t]he most 
salient harm of surveillance is that it threatens . . . ‘intellectual privacy’”—
the idea that  
new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of 
public exposure; that people should be able to make up their minds 
at times and places of their own choosing; and that a meaningful 
guarantee of privacy—protection from surveillance or 
interference—is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual 
freedom.247 
Citizens who fear constant government intrusion into their private spaces 
will be much less likely to maintain a free and robust private life.248   
Of course, the rapid rise in covert searches does not show that the 
United States has become a totalitarian state.249  But the fact that covert 
searches and surveillance are favorite tools of totalitarian control and 
repression should alert us to the very real dangers to privacy, liberty, and 
dissent posed by covert searches.250   
Traditional searches (with notice) do not carry this “known unknown” 
privacy cost.251  With traditional searches, each person in the community 
knows when and if her home or business has been searched by the 
government.252  That person suffers a significant privacy intrusion—an 
intrusion justified by the finding of probable cause to believe that the 
specific home or business contains contraband or evidence of a crime.253  
The privacy intrusion of these searches is deep but narrow—deep in the 
sense that one’s home has been searched, and narrow in the sense that the 
invasion impacts only those few who are searched.  With delayed notice 
 
 246.  Jed Rubenfeld, Privacy’s End, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 217 (H. 
Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009).   
 247.  Richards, supra note 242, at 1945–46.  See also Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013) (“Privacy shelters dynamic, emergent subjectivity from the efforts 
of commercial and government actors to render individuals and communities fixed, transparent, and 
predictable.  It protects the situated practices of boundary management through which the capacity 
for self-determination develops.”). 
 248.  See Richards, supra note 242, at 1952–53. 
 249.  Id. at 1952. 
 250.  Id. at 1934. 
 251.  See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 252.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(c) (2010). 
 253.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-05 (1981). 
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searches, however, every member of the community suffers a more indirect 
and uncertain loss of privacy.  Delayed notice searches thus create an 
additional privacy intrusion, one that is shallow but broad—broad in the 
sense that everyone in the jurisdiction might feel the privacy loss, and 
shallow in the sense that this feeling of uncertainty is a less severe privacy 
loss than that caused by an actual, invasive search. 
This unique feature of delayed notice searches also occurs in wiretaps—
another form of covert, delayed notice search.254  As Kent Greenawalt 
observes, the more often wiretapping (covert searches of conversations) 
occurs, the greater the privacy intrusion on the entire community.255  The 
more wiretapping there is,  
the larger will be the class of people who will have realistic fears 
that someone is trying to hear, and succeeding.  And even those 
who have no specific basis for such a fear will be exposed to an 
increasing probability that mere curiosity seekers are listening to 
what they say.256 
This loss of privacy in telephone conversation may also infringe free and 
open communication in the society at large: “As the commonplace 
overhearing of society’s leading figures became widely publicized, the idea 
that it is not safe to divulge secrets would frighten those not actually 
threatened.  Any general inhibition on free communication for an important 
segment of society would certainly seep through to society as a whole.”257 
These two privacy invasions—the distress of knowing the government 
secretly searched one’s home, and the broad uncertainty created in the entire 
community by covert searches—are distinct from the privacy costs of the 
underlying physical intrusion itself.  In the years leading up to the drafting of 
the Fourth Amendment, “Samuel Adams complained that customs searches 
of houses under general warrants left citizens ‘cut off from that domestick 
security which renders [life agreeable].’”258  These distinct privacy intrusions 
 
 254.  See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: 
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 
189 (1968). 
 255.  Id. at 218. 
 255.  Id. at 218. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Davies, supra note 241, at 602 n.139 (alteration in original). 
[Vol. 41: 509, 2014] The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
557 
caused by covert searching threaten to cut off the “domestick security” of 
the home in a particularly corrosive and broad-reaching manner.259  As a 
matter of Fourth Amendment first principles, covert searching infringes on 
the privacy and repose of the home—the castle and fortress guarded by the 
Fourth Amendment.260  This does not show that delayed notice search 
warrants are always and everywhere unconstitutional.  But it does suggest, 
contrary to the approach of most courts to date, that covert searching raises 
serious Fourth Amendment issues that warrant skepticism and demand more 
compelling justifications.  
B.  Covert Seizures Create Fear of Burglary and the Risk of Private 
Violence 
Covert seizures—”sneak and steal” searches—raise additional Fourth 
Amendment concerns beyond those raised by covert searches.261  To keep 
the government’s role in the seizure secret, the government often stages the 
seizure to appear as a private burglary.262  This gives rise to a variety of 
concerns.263   
First, the government often damages additional property, such as 
breaking windows or doors, to create the impression of a break-in.264  In one 
case involving the covert search of a car, officers  
directed the personnel conducting the search of the vehicle to make 
it appear as though the vehicle had been vandalized while it was left 
unattended on the side of the Thruway.  They broke a pool cue 
found in the back of the car, presumably belonging to the vehicle’s 
occupants, and used it to pry open the glove compartment, 
damaging the glove compartment and making it appear as if there 
had been an attempted break-in.265 
 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Id. at 602–03. 
 261.  See Shumate, supra note 2. 
 262.  See Shumate, supra note 2. 
 263.  Id. at 209–11. 
 264.  See, e.g., DeArmon v. Burgess,  , 611 (8th Cir. 2004) (“According to appellants, the officers 
broke entry doors and locks on interior doors, damaged drywall and furniture, and seized a firearm, 
doorknobs and locks, photographs, personal papers, and jewelry.”). 
 265.  United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, C.J.). 
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Preventing this type of physical damage is one of the rationales for the 
general Fourth Amendment “notice” rule recognized in Wilson v. Arkansas, 
as discussed below.266  This additional physical damage to the home is thus 
one of the types of harm the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. 
Second, the person whose property has been seized will presumably, 
upon returning home, believe their home has been burglarized.267  By 
conducting a covert seizure, the government causes the homeowner to suffer 
the fear and distress of a home burglary—a serious infringement on the 
privacy and repose of the home.268 
Finally, when the property seized is contraband (as will often be the 
case), there is a danger that the aggrieved party will resort to private 
remedies, including violence, in response to the perceived burglary.269  If the 
“victims” of the “burglary” are in fact criminals involved in serious or 
violent crime, those victims are more likely to seek a remedy in private 
retaliation rather than police involvement.270  In United States v. Espinoza, 
the district court warned that “when property is seized, as it was in this case, 
it creates the potential for innocent people being injured because the owners 
of the property may incorrectly blame and sanction in some way a person 
innocent of the seizure.”271  The court noted that following the “sneak and 
steal” search, the targets of the search “focused on the brother of Ms. 
Espinoza” as the possible burglar, thereby “exposing him to danger of 
injury.”272  In United States v. Miranda, DEA agents specifically intended 
for their burglary operation to trigger a response from the targets of the 
“break-in”:  “the agents hoped to precipitate activity within the Cuevas 
conspiracy that would provide additional evidence of criminal conduct.”273  
The staged burglary “had the desired effect,” prompting two drug dealers to 
debate—in a recorded conversation—about the identity of the burglar, and to 
 
 266.  See infra notes 431, 436–40 and accompanying text. 
 267.  Shumate, supra note 2, at 231. 
 268.  See, e.g., Mayfield v. Gonzales, No. Civ. 04-1427-AA, 2005 WL 1801679, at *3 (D. Or. 
July 28, 2005) (reciting allegations that covert government searches “caus[ed] the Mayfield family to 
be frightened and believe that they had been burglarized”). 
 269.  See infra notes 271–73 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 271.  United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519, at *5 (E.D. Wash. 
Dec. 23, 2005).   
 272.   Id.   
 273.  425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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move operations to another location.274  The court does not mention the 
attendant risk that the “activity” “precipitated” by the staged burglary easily 
could have become something much more violent than mere discussion.275 
In summary, the covert nature of a search intrudes on the privacy and 
sanctity of the home in ways distinct from the existing intrusions of a 
traditional search.  As a matter of Fourth Amendment first principles, covert 
searching clearly implicates the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
III.  COVERT SEARCHING AND THE FOUNDING-ERA HISTORY OF SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE:  DELAYED NOTICE RUNS AFOUL OF THE “RULE REQUIRING 
NOTICE”  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment is informed by the history of search and seizure law in the years 
leading up to the drafting of the Bill of Rights.276  What precise role that 
history should play and what the historical record shows, are matters of 
considerable dispute.277  Those disputes can be set aside, at least temporarily, 
 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) (“In determining whether a search or 
seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history.  We look to the statutes and common law of the 
founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.”); Atwater 
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (“In reading the [Fourth] Amendment, we are 
guided by the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the 
common law at the time of the framing, since [a]n examination of the common-law understanding of 
an officer’s authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, 
consideration of what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable.” 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Florida v. White, 526 
U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (“In deciding whether a challenged governmental action violates the [Fourth] 
Amendment, we have taken care to inquire whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search 
and seizure when the Amendment was framed.”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); 
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
 277.  Compare Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 
(1994) (arguing, in part based on history, that the central command of the Fourth Amendment is not 
warrants or probable cause, but that searches and seizures be “reasonable”), with Thomas Y. Davies, 
Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search 
Rules in “Due Process of Law”—”Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, 
Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51 (2010) (arguing that the warrant clause is the 
core of the Fourth Amendment, and that the “reasonableness” clause is simply a reference to 
searches conducted with prohibited general warrants).  See also CUDDIHY, supra note 232, at 773–82 
(rejecting Amar’s claim and stating that his rejection of probable cause for non-warrant searches 
“amounts to delusional pontification,” and arguing that Davies’ conception of “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” is too narrow). 
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in light of the Court’s repeated assertions that historical practice is relevant 
at least in some manner.278  
To date, no court or commentator has searched the historical record for 
evidence—either for or against—of delayed notice search warrants or any 
other form of legally authorized, covert searching at the time of the 
founding.279  If it were clear, for example, that delayed notice search 
warrants were commonly used without objection in the years leading up to 
1791, this would suggest that the practice is constitutionally permissible.  
During congressional debate over the USA Patriot Act in 2001, Senator 
Orrin Hatch argued that delayed notice search warrants are “totally 
constitutional,” and that the practice has been upheld “from the beginning of 
this country.”280  Strong evidence to the contrary—such as evidence that 
colonial courts and commentators had repeatedly denounced delayed notice 
search warrants—would cast doubt on the constitutionality of the practice. 
The first important historical question, then, is whether there is record of 
any discussion of covert searching or delayed notice search warrants around 
the time of the founding and the drafting of the Bill of Rights.  As explained 
in Part III.A, there is not: there is no evidence that officials ever sought, or 
courts or commentators ever discussed, a legal mechanism authorizing 
officials to conduct a search covertly, giving notice only later or never 
giving notice at all.   
The second question, also addressed in Part III.A, is how this history 
bears on the constitutionality of this relatively new procedural innovation.  I 
argue that no strong normative conclusions can be drawn from this history.  
The lack of delayed notice search warrants at the time of the founding does 
not show that the framers (or the common law) implicitly rejected or 
endorsed this practice.  Instead, the absence of delayed notice search 
warrants is more likely a reflection of the eighteenth-century criminal justice 
system, in particular the lack of law enforcement organizations that would 
conduct complex, forward-looking investigations.   
 
 278.  See Amar, supra note 277, at 759; see also Davis, supra note 277 (analyzing whether the 
Fourth Amendment decisions should be based on history and how well the Supreme Court sets out 
Fourth Amendment history); CUDDIHY, supra note 232 (extensively reviewing and commenting on 
the origins and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 279.  See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 232; JACOB B. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE 
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE 
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
(Da Capo Press 1970) (1937). 
 280.  147 CONG. REC. 20,704 (2001). 
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This does not end the historical inquiry.  While there is no historical 
evidence of a delayed notice search warrant procedure, there is ample 
evidence that the common law contained a requirement that clearly 
implicates this modern procedural innovation.281  As explained in Part III.B, 
the common law required persons executing search warrants to give notice 
of the impending search, and demand entry from the occupant, before 
breaking down the door.  The Supreme Court has held that this common law 
requirement is incorporated into the Fourth Amendment, as part of the 
prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”282  Delayed notice 
search warrants presumptively violate this “rule requiring notice,” and thus 
raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns.  To date, courts and 
commentators have implicitly assumed—without discussion or analysis—
that the common law “notice” requirement has no relevance to the 
constitutionality of covert, delayed notice searches.283  In Part III.B, I argue 
that this assumption is unjustified and incorrect. 
A.  Covert, Delayed Notice Searches Did Not Exist at the Time of the 
Founding 
It is often difficult to evaluate modern practices by looking to 
eighteenth-century historical practice because modern practices often 
involve new technologies that did not exist (and were not readily 
imaginable) in 1791.  Trying to figure out what the framers would have 
thought about GPS monitoring of cars, for example, risks devolving into a 
debate over miniaturized constables riding below horse-drawn carriages.284  
But delayed notice search warrants do not involve technological innovations 
like wiretapping or GPS monitoring.285  The practice is a procedural 
 
 281.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 927. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 284.  Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (“But it is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century 
situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.  (Is it possible to imagine a case in 
which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in 
order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?)”); id. at 950 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The 
Court suggests that something like this might have occurred in 1791, but this would have required 
either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with incredible 
fortitude and patience.”). 
 285.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DELAYED NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS: A VITAL AND TIME-
HONORED TOOL FOR FIGHTING CRIME (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/ 
patriotact213report.pdf (citing three cases in which delayed notice search warrants were upheld and 
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innovation that could have been pursued by those requesting warrants 
throughout history.286  The idea of a secret search—and the benefits that 
secrecy provides—has been evident for millennia.287  
Even so, it did not occur to searchers in England and the colonies in the 
centuries leading up to 1791 to ask for search warrants authorizing a secret 
search with notice given only long after the fact (if at all).  There are many 
cases, discussed in Part III.B, emphasizing that searchers must announce 
their presence and authority before breaking a door to conduct a search.288  
Those cases, however, all presume that the occupant will learn of the search 
the instant the door is broken and the searchers loudly enter and begin their 
search.  None of these cases contemplates the idea that the entire search 
might be secret, with notice provided (if at all) only days or weeks later. 
The idea of a delayed notice warrant—or any search specifically 
authorized to be conducted secretly—does not appear in any of the historical 
work on pre-Fourth Amendment search and seizure.289  The practice does not 
appear in William Cuddihy’s magisterial history of British and colonial 
search and seizure through 1791.290  Nor does it appear in earlier canonical 
works by Nelson Lasson and Jacob Landynski.291  Thomas Davies’s 
extensive scholarship on the history of search and seizure leading up to the 
drafting of the Fourth Amendment likewise unearths no evidence of delayed 
notice search warrants.292  Extensive review of case law and commentary 
likewise reveals no discussion, either before 1791 or in the following 
decades, of the concept of a legally authorized covert search, or anything 
resembling a delayed notice search warrant. 
There are two incidents from what might be called the “pre-history” of 
the Fourth Amendment that have some marginal relevance: covert searches 
 
technologies were not necessarily used in the search). 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  See, supra, notes 348, 354–75 and accompanying text. 
 289.  See supra note 279. 
 290.  CUDDIHY, supra note 232.  Legal historian Leonard Levy has stated, “Cuddihy is the best 
authority on the origins of the Fourth Amendment.”  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND 
THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 441 n.1 (1988).  Other commentators have stated that “[o]ur 
knowledge of the Fourth Amendment’s history was fundamentally transformed” by William 
Cuddihy’s 1990 Ph.D. dissertation, now published in book form by Oxford.  Tracey Maclin & Julia 
Mirabella, Framing the Fourth, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2011).   
 291.  LASSON, supra note 279; LANDYNSKI, supra note 279. 
 292.  See Davies, supra note 277; Davies, supra note 241. 
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conducted at Cambridge University in 1557,293 and a covert search of Sir 
Edward Coke’s home and law offices in 1621.294  Neither of these cases 
involved search warrants authorizing covert entry, and neither case can be 
described as an immediate precursor to the Fourth Amendment.295  
Nonetheless, both incidents involve covert, delayed notice searches, and 
both form a part of the long history of abuse and oppression that led to the 
development of British search and seizure limitations and, in the new 
American republic, to the Fourth Amendment.296 
Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England featured many invasive, 
general searches for the purpose of discovering and punishing religious 
dissent.297  In 1557, during the reign of Catholic Queen Mary, a royal 
commission was “[d]ispatched to Cambridge [University] to investigate its 
conformity to Catholicism.”298  The commission “demanded that each 
member of the university community submit an inventory of his personal 
library to facilitate the destruction of heretical books.”299  The head of each 
college of the university was instructed to enforce this decree.300  In a turn 
that should warm the hearts of any university faculty, the college 
administrators did a poor job of ferreting out heresy, seeming to choose 
loyalty to faculty independence over fealty to the royal commission.301  In 
response, the commission “devised an effective counterstrategy: summon 
one or two leading scholars at a time and concurrently search their vacant 
residences during their absence.  For three days, the university’s records 
attested to the strategy’s effectiveness as whole containers of books were 
surrendered.”302 
In other words, the commission turned to covert searches of scholarly 
residences, deliberately conducted without notice when the scholars were 
 
 293.  CUDDIHY, supra note 232, at 73–74. 
 294.  Id. at 140. 
 295.  Id. at 73, 140. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id. at 73 (“The most vigorous, far-reaching searches before 1642 aimed at persons and books 
that criticized the Crown or the established church.”); id. at 73–84 (relating various searches in the 
1500s and 1600s conducted to root out religious dissent). 
 298.   Id. at 73–74. 
 299.  Id. at 74. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Id. 
[Vol. 41: 509, 2014] The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
564 
away by design.303  It is hard to imagine that the scholars in question could 
have hidden all of their heretical texts had the searches been conducted in 
the manner of a modern, conventional search—with a knock and demand for 
entry moments before breaking in.  But even so, it was no doubt even more 
convenient to conduct searches when the occupants were absent—avoiding 
the unpleasantness of confrontation and, perhaps, warnings to other 
colleagues of impending searches. 
The second covert search incident comes from 1621.304  Sir Edward 
Coke, author of the Institutes of the Common Law, had previously served as 
Attorney General and in the King’s Privy Council.305  By 1621, however, 
Coke had fallen out of favor and was imprisoned by King James I.306  
Government searchers employed a tactic similar to that used in the 
Cambridge University searches—the search of a home while the owner was 
away.307  “While the Crown’s legal officers interrogated Coke and denied 
him access to all books, other agents of the king entered his house in Broad 
Street and his legal chambers in the Inner Temple.”308  The searches were 
conducted with warrants, but there is no suggestion that the warrant said 
anything about whether the search would be executed with notice to the 
occupant or without.309  Years later, in a 1628 speech to the House of 
Commons, Coke cited this interrogation and search as an example of the 
need for a bill of rights.  “Coke contended that if a man’s house could be 
searched while he was confined without being told the cause, ‘they will find 
cause enough.’”310   
Neither of these cases provides direct commentary on the legality of a 
covert search authorized by a delayed notice warrant.  Both, however, show 
the use of covert searches, deliberately conducted when the occupant was 
absent.  There is no evidence that the framers, or the colonists more 
generally, were aware of these specific instances of search abuses.  But both 
cases are part of the history of abusive search practices that gradually led 
 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Id. at 140. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. at 141. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Id. at 141 (quoting Sp., Coke, 29 April 1628, Commons Debates, 1628, vol.#3 (21 Apr.–27 
May), pp. 150, col. 2; 154, 159, 162; col. 2; quote at p. 159, col. 2). 
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Englishmen—eventually including the colonists—to view broad search 
powers with suspicion, and to insist on limitations of that power.  It would 
be wrong to claim that these two examples were in the founders’ minds 
when drafting the Fourth Amendment, or that the examples show the 
framers specifically contemplated outlawing covert searches.  At the same 
time, the Fourth Amendment emerged out of a centuries-long history of 
legal, political, and popular opposition to expansive and abusive search 
powers.311  These two incidents of covert searching are part of that history of 
abuse. 
Apart from these two cases, the historical record contains no reference 
to the practice of a search warrant authorizing covert entry with notice given 
later, if at all.  What can be inferred from the absence in the historical record 
of delayed notice search warrants?   
Arguments from silence must always be approached with great care.312  
For opponents of delayed notice search warrants, it is tempting to conclude 
that, because delayed notice warrants could have existed in 1791 but did not, 
the founders implicitly rejected them.  Perhaps covert searching was simply 
so far beyond the pale that the framers did not think to explicitly address that 
practice in the Fourth Amendment.  For example, one commentator states, 
“[t]he Framers likely never contemplated ordinary officers being permitted 
to enter an individual’s home, conduct a search, potentially seize property, 
and not provide notice of the search until some time in the future.”313  This is 
true—as explained below, the framers likely never contemplated this 
practice.  What is far less clear is the relevance of this fact to constitutional 
interpretation.   
 
 311.  Id. at lxiii-lxviii. 
 312.  See, e.g., John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 2032 (2011) (“Silence, however, is not a terribly reliable basis for inferring a 
constitutional prohibition.”); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 671–
72 (1987) (“Rule 4: Arguments from silence are unreliable and often completely ahistorical.”).  
Powell’s article is aimed at “originalists,” but the dangers of arguing from silence apply to anyone 
relying on history to inform constitutional interpretation, whether from an originalist perspective or 
otherwise. 
 313.  Seltzer, supra note 228.  I do not mean to suggest that Seltzer’s historical argument consists 
primarily of the (faulty) argument that “the framers never contemplated it, thus it must be 
unconstitutional.”  The sentence quoted above has shades of that view.  Seltzer’s main historical 
argument relies on first principles—that history shows that the “Framers particularly valued the 
sanctity and security of the home,” and that covert searching violates those values.  Id.  In that 
regard, I agree broadly that the first principles underlying the Fourth Amendment are clearly 
implicated by the practice of covert searching.  See supra Part II.  
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Given the silent historical record, the first question is whether the 
delayed notice search warrant was a practice that “could have been raised by 
the founders—was thinkable in their conceptual world.”314  If not, then 
silence is not very relevant:  “[n]ot even a tentative conclusion can be drawn 
from an argument ex silentio when our concern is one totally alien to the 
founders’ conceptual and political universe.”315 
In one sense, the basic concept of a covert search was clearly 
“thinkable” to the founders.  But that does not show that the concept was 
something the founders actually considered and rejected.  On the contrary, 
there is good reason to believe the founders never contemplated, and thus 
took no stance on, the notion of a covert search using a delayed notice search 
warrant.  This absence is best explained by considering the nature of the 
eighteenth-century criminal justice system, and in particular the nature and 
context of the searches that so troubled the colonists.316  Today, investigators 
use delayed notice search warrants mostly in complex investigations, in 
attempts to unravel complicated, ongoing criminal conspiracies.317  The 
criminal justice system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a 
different focus, and was populated by entirely different law enforcement 
actors and institutions.318  
Criminal law then, like now, punished violent crimes like murder or 
rape, as well as a variety of theft offenses.319  But delayed notice search 
warrants (today) are usually not used to investigate ordinary murders, rapes, 
or theft offenses—they are used to investigate ongoing conspiracies or 
complex criminal schemes, mostly involving drugs, as well as extortion and 
fraud.320  Officials in the eighteenth century were not conducting searches to 
slowly assemble evidence for the prosecution of complex conspiracies.  The 
lack of forensic science meant there was no need to conduct a covert search 
 
 314.  Powell, supra note 312, at 671. 
 315.  Id. at 671–72. 
 316.  Davies, supra note 241, at 734–35 (“[T]he concern with fitting the historical meaning to 
modern doctrine has tainted prior accounts with prochronistic concerns and ideological slants that 
were foreign to the authentic history.  The authentic history can be recovered only by respecting the 
foreignness of the past and by immersing oneself in its records.”). 
 317.  See supra Part I.B. 
 318.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27–30 
(1993) (describing the colonial justice system as a “business of amateurs” where many of the actors 
were lay citizens). 
 319.  Id. at 6. 
 320.  See supra Part I.B, Figure 1, note 141. 
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for fingerprints or other incriminating forensic evidence.321  Indeed, “[i]n the 
late eighteenth century, searches were still of limited utility to criminal law 
enforcement.”322  Officials searched for the object of the crime—such as the 
stolen property or the smuggled goods—rather than evidentiary items that 
could be used to construct a more elaborate proof of the crime.323   
Criminal investigations were very different in part because law 
enforcement officials were very different.  In the centuries before 1791, 
neither England nor the colonies had standing police forces with broad 
powers of criminal investigation.324  “There were no police in the modern 
sense. . . . Constables made arrests, and night watchmen patrolled the streets 
of the bigger towns.”325  Constables and night watchmen were relatively low-
status, unpaid volunteers, pressed into temporary service—while 
maintaining their paid jobs—as part of fulfilling their civic duty.326  Thus the 
colonial criminal justice system in general, and criminal investigation in 
particular, was conducted by amateurs, not trained, salaried professionals.327  
Today, delayed notice search warrants are sought and executed mostly by 
the FBI, a large, well-funded institution devoted to criminal investigation 
that had no counterpart in the colonial era.328 
The amateur nature of colonial law enforcement meant criminal 
investigations were likewise much simpler affairs.  “Proactive criminal law 
enforcement had not yet developed by the framing of the Bill of Rights; in 
fact, even post-crime investigation by officers was minimal.”329  The charge 
of volunteer constables was “to preserve order by keeping an eye on taverns, 
controlling drunks, apprehending vagrants, and responding to ‘affrays’ 
(fights) and other disturbances—but they were not otherwise expected to 
 
 321.  Davies, supra note 241, at 627 (“In the absence of forensic science, items other than stolen 
property would usually have been of limited evidentiary value.”). 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Id.  Cuddihy explains that colonial search warrants “were often used to capture fugitives, 
collect revenues, stop counterfeiting, and seize contraband of various sorts.”  CUDDIHY, supra note 
232, at 231.  See generally id. at 236–41 for a discussion of the typical subjects of colonial warrants.  
 324.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 318, at 27; Davies, supra note 241, at 620–23. 
 325.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 318, at 28. 
 326.  Id. at 27; Davies, supra note 241, at 620. 
 327.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 318, at 27; see also STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3–6 (2012). 
 328.  See HOLDEN, supra note 56. 
 329.  Davies, supra note 241, at 620. 
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investigate crime.”330   
Because colonial law enforcement was conducted by unpaid amateurs, 
not salaried professionals, “the Framers did not share the modern 
expectation that police officers will tend to be overzealous in ‘the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”331  On the contrary, “[t]he 
amateur constable of the framing-era . . . had little motive to act ‘at his own 
risk,’” and “[t]he principal historical complaint regarding constables was not 
their overzealousness so much as their inaction.”332  It is not surprising that 
these actors did not develop a new procedural tool most useful for 
assembling evidence as part of a long-term criminal investigation. 
Customs searches—a major focus of the framers’ concern over general 
warrants—were somewhat different.  They were initiated by higher-status 
customs officers rather than lowly constables.333  Even so, customs officers 
did not have anything like the salaried investigative team of today’s joint 
task force operations.  Instead, relatively few customs officers attempted to 
monitor smuggling over large areas, assisted by local officials dragged into 
service through writs of assistance.334  Colonial customs officers struggled 
mightily simply to execute basic searches and confiscate untaxed goods.335  
They faced a hostile merchant population dependent on widespread 
smuggling for large parts of the colonial economy.336  Even when smuggled 
goods were discovered, customs agents sometimes lacked the manpower to 
effectively secure those goods before locals brazenly spirited them away.337  
 
 330.  Id. at 621–22 (footnotes omitted). 
 331.  Id. at 640–41 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)). 
 332.  Id. at 641 (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 318, at 68). 
 333.  See CUDDIHY, supra note 232, at 779–80. 
 334.  Id. at 490–503.   
 335.  Id. 
 336.  Id.  Cuddihy observes that “an obstructive public and uncooperative local officials” 
effectively defeated the purposes of general customs searches.  Id. at 511.  Colonists “[t]arred and 
feathered customs officers, cowed magistrates,” and conducted “mob ‘liberations’ of seizures.”  Id.   
By 1776, more than a decade of epidemic smuggling had eviscerated the British customs 
establishment in Massachusetts.  That prominent merchants had openly run whole 
cargoes ashore was common knowledge in Boston by 1768. . . .  In such an atmosphere 
[Governor Francis] Bernard remarked that the customs officers either did not know, or 
found it healthy not to know, the location of smuggled goods, while merchants bragged 
publicly that they would not allow even their ships to be searched. 
Id.   
 337.  Cuddihy recounts a number of colorful stories showing how hostile the local merchant 
population was to customs searches.  The Polly affair, in 1765, “illustrated . . . the impotence of 
British customs authorities in enforcing general warrants in Massachusetts.”  Id. at 491.  Customs 
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Colonial courts repeatedly refused to grant customs officers search powers 
necessary to carry out their duties.338   
Colonial customs officers were waging a losing battle to detect and 
confiscate untaxed goods, and were kept busy fighting to obtain adequate 
legal authority and manpower to simply search and seize contraband goods.  
They did not have the resources necessary to conduct more elaborate 
investigations that might have unearthed the larger conspiracies behind the 
rampant colonial smuggling, and for which delayed notice search warrants 
would have proved a useful tool. 
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from the absence of delayed 
notice search warrants in the centuries leading up to the Fourth Amendment?  
In many cases, history “will not provide answers to specific issues.”339  
Scholars must resist trying to “discover” the hidden views of the framers on 
issues that did not confront them, and which they never discussed.340  As 
Justice Thomas has written, “because of the very different nature and scope 
of federal authority and ability to conduct searches and arrests at the 
founding, it is possible that neither the history of the Fourth Amendment nor 
the common law provides much guidance.”341   
Covert searches do appear—in the search at Cambridge and of Sir 
 
officers seized the ship Polly on the Tauton River, loaded with molasses far exceeding what had 
been declared.  Id.  That evening, “a mob of forty locals emptied the ship and left her aground.”  Id. 
at 491–92.   
  In another incident, in 1776, two customs agents found “over ten hogsheads of smuggled rum 
and sugar” in shopkeeper Enoch Isley’s store in Falmouth, Massachusetts.  Id. at 496.  They could 
not remove the barrels themselves, and neighbors refused to help.  Id.  They obtain a writ of 
assistance, which was physically torn from the pocket of a local official, and were attacked by a 
local mob.  Id.  By the next day, the hogsheads had vanished from Isley’s store.  Id.   
  In the Malcolm affair, which Cuddihy describes as “the most famous search in colonial 
America,” customs agents sought to search for untaxed brandy at the home of Daniel Malcolm.  Id. 
at 496–501.  Their attempt to search Malcolm’s cellar led to an escalating confrontation between 
customs agents and Malcolm that nearly led to bloodshed.  Id. 
 338.  See id. at 503–05.  Cuddihy describes customs officials’ attempts to “extend writs of 
assistance to all of the colonies beyond Massachusetts and New Hampshire” as “one of the most 
arrant failures in American legal history.”  Id. at 508–09. 
 339.  Davies, supra note 241, at 750. 
 340.  Id. at 734–35 (“[T]he concern with fitting the historical meaning to modern doctrine has 
tainted prior accounts with prochronistic concerns and ideological slants that were foreign to the 
authentic history.  The authentic history can be recovered only by respecting the foreignness of the 
past and by immersing oneself in its records.”). 
 341.  Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas made 
this comment as a general statement of the potential limitations of relying on history to resolve 
contemporary Fourth Amendment interpretation disputes. 
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Edward Coke—in the history of search abuses leading up to legal reforms 
such as the Fourth Amendment.342  And as discussed in Part III.B, the 
common law had firmly adopted the principle—subject to exceptions—that 
searchers should give notice and demand entry before breaking down a door.  
On the narrow question of delayed notice search warrants, however, the 
common law of search and seizure provides little guidance because the 
practice did not exist.  Most likely, it did not exist because of radical 
differences in the pre-1791 criminal justice system.   
Thinking more broadly, the history of the Fourth Amendment “shows 
that framing-era doctrine provided a much stronger notion of a ‘right to be 
secure’ in person and house than does modern doctrine,” and thus “the 
burden of justification for further expansions of police power . . . should fall 
squarely on the proponents of police power.”343  The Fourth Amendment was 
a radical restriction on search powers relative to the status quo in the 
1790s—radical primarily in its insistence on the specific rather than general 
warrant in all circumstances.344  The drafters articulated relatively extreme 
search restrictions not only to vindicate privacy interests, but also as a 
political maneuver—an extremely effective one.345  By proffering a Bill of 
Rights that dramatically limited federal powers, the Federalists successfully 
sought to fracture the Antifederalist coalition and garner support from a 
sufficient number of Antifederalists to ensure ratification of the 
Constitution.346  In light of this general history, it is appropriate to approach 
this procedural innovation with some level of skepticism. 
B.  Covert Searching Violates the Fourth Amendment “Rule Requiring 
Notice” 
Part II explained how covert searching infringes on the fundamental 
privacy concerns, related to the sanctity of the home from unreasonable 
 
 342.  See supra Part III.A, 
 343.  Davies, supra note 241, at 749–50.   
 344.  CUDDIHY, supra note 232, at 279 (“The Fourth Amendment incorporated an extreme rather 
than the norm of British thought on search and seizure not only by repudiating general warrants but 
also by intruding specific warrants in their place.”). 
 345.  Id. at 704–12.  Cuddihy explains that James Madison “designed the Bill of Rights as a 
wedge between the moderate and radical factions of Antifederalism.”  Id. at 708.   
 346.  “The short-term goal of the Fourth Amendment and of its neighboring amendments was not 
to insure rights regarding search, seizure, or other government activities but to isolate the extreme 
Antifederalists by seducing their moderate compatriots into the Federalist ranks.”  Id. at 710. 
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government intrusion, that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.  
Providing notice at the time of a search—the opposite of covert searching—
prevents the various harms identified above from occurring.347  And the 
argument that covert searching raises Fourth Amendment concerns does not 
rest only on a generalized analysis of privacy interests, but also on the 
common law—and constitutional—”rule requiring notice.”     
In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court relied on historical precedents 
in the years leading up to the founding to conclude that “the Fourth 
Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that police officers 
entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and 
purpose before attempting forcible entry.”348  The Court so held in the 
context of what is now often called the “knock and announce” rule—that 
officers must ordinarily announce their presence and request admission 
before breaking doors to search.349   
As noted in Part I.A, courts and commentators evaluating delayed notice 
search warrants over the past three decades have almost uniformly failed to 
draw any connection between delayed notice warrants and this common law 
notice requirement.350  It is not that courts have considered the issue and 
concluded that the common law requirement does not apply to delayed 
 
 347.  See supra Part II. 
 348.  Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 
(1995)). 
 349.  See id. at 387–88. 
 350.  See supra note 89.  One exception is Paul V. Konovalov, who discusses “sneak and peek” 
searches in light of Wilson v. Arkansas soon after Wilson was decided.  Konovalov, supra note 15, at 
462–64.  Konovalov appears to misunderstand Wilson.  He claims that Wilson held “that a ‘knock 
and announce’ procedure (that functions primarily as a means of providing notice) is not 
constitutionally required.”  Id. at 463 (emphasis added).  Starting with that (erroneous) view of 
Wilson’s holding, he thus concludes that “Wilson provides further support for the proposition that the 
Fourth Amendment does not require notice.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This gets matters precisely 
backwards.  To be sure, the Court in Wilson did not hold that prior notice of entry was always 
required.  But the Court did hold that notice of entry is a constitutional requirement (subject to 
exceptions): the common law rule that “generally indicated that [a searcher] first ought to announce 
his presence and authority . . . forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.  In a later case, the Court more squarely stated that “the 
Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that police officers entering a 
dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible 
entry.”  Richards, 520 U.S. at 387 (citation omitted).  Konavalov’s view implies that if notice is not 
always required, then notice is not a constitutional requirement at all.  On the contrary, Wilson (and 
later cases) made clear that notice is a constitutional requirement, albeit one subject to certain 
exceptions.  See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Fatal Flaws, supra note 36 (analyzing the exceptions to the 
notice rule and comparing those to the statutory authorizations for delayed-notice search warrants). 
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notice warrants.351  Instead, no court has ever considered the question at 
all.352  Courts—as well as commentators—appear to place the common law 
notice requirement firmly into a discrete “knock and announce” box, kept 
separate and apart from the practice of covert searches through delayed 
notice search warrants.353   
This doctrinal separation has never been explained or justified, merely 
assumed.  The assumption is unwarranted.  The common law “knock and 
announce” requirement, and the practice of covert searching with delayed-
notice warrants, both implicate the same fundamental Fourth Amendment 
principle that notice must be provided at the time a search is executed, 
absent exceptional circumstances.  There is no justification for separating the 
two doctrines.  Covert searching with delayed notice warrants, if 
constitutional at all, must be evaluated from the starting premise that 
providing notice of a search is a critical component of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness, and any derogation from that constitutional command must 
be justified by sufficiently compelling government interests.   
Part III.B.1 first explains the origins and nature of the common law 
“knock and announce” requirement—or what more accurately might be 
called the common law “notice” requirement.  Part III.B.2 argues that covert, 
delayed notice searching is subject to this constitutional principle.  Part 
III.B.3 compares the interests protected by the common law “notice” rule 
with the privacy interests endangered by a covert search, further supporting 
the conclusion that covert searching is subject to the common law “notice” 
rule.   
1.  Notice Is Part of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness  
In Wilson v. Arkansas, Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, 
explained that “the common law of search and seizure recognized a law 
enforcement officer’s authority to break open the doors of a dwelling, but 
generally indicated that he first ought to announce his presence and 
authority.”354  That common law rule, the Court held, “forms a part of the 
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.”355   
 
 351.  See infra Part III.B.1–3. 
 352.  See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.  
 353.  See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 354.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). 
 355.   Id. 
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The Wilson Court concluded that “notice” is part of Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” by relying primarily on the history of search and seizure 
pre-dating the Fourth Amendment.356  To give content to the meaning of 
“unreasonable” search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
explained that it looks “to the traditional protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the 
framing.”357  The Court’s “examination of the common law of search and 
seizure leaves no doubt that the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling 
may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their 
presence and authority prior to entering.”358   
The Court has repeatedly stated that the common law limitations on 
search and seizure at the time of the founding help define the meaning of an 
“unreasonable search and seizure” under the Fourth Amendment.359  It is 
worth noting that this—the very first step in the Court’s use of founding-era 
history to interpret the Fourth Amendment—is contested.360  That debate is 
beyond the scope of this article.  Given the state of the doctrine, this article 
proceeds from the Supreme Court’s premise—which shows no signs of 
changing—and evaluates the constitutionality of delayed notice search 
 
 356.  Id. at 929–30. 
 357.  Id. at 931. 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  See supra note 276. 
 360.  Thomas Davies has forcefully argued that the Court’s starting premise is mistaken.  Davies, 
supra note 277.  He argues that the phrase “unreasonable search and seizure” simply refers to 
general warrants, not to some broader “reasonableness” standard, and not to other common law 
search and seizure limitations unrelated to the general warrant.  Id. at 85–107.  William Cuddihy 
agrees that the phrase “unreasonable search and seizure” was not meant to create an amorphous 
“reasonableness” balancing test often employed by the Supreme Court today.  CUDDIHY, supra note 
232, at 739, 770–72.  Cuddihy argues, however, that “unreasonable search and seizure” not only 
referred to the general warrant, but also to specific and well-understood limitations on search and 
seizure law circa 1791, including the prohibition against “[u]nannounced searches.”  Id. at lxv, 739–
72.  Davies, in turn, agrees that the common law required searchers to give notice of their presence 
and demand entry before using force to enter.  Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-
and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest 
Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 264 n. 67 (2002).  Davies argues, 
however, that the history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment plainly shows that “unreasonable 
search and seizure” referred only to the use of general warrants, and that there is no “evidence of a 
broad reasonableness standard regarding arrests or searches in the historical record.”  Davies, supra 
note 277, at 60.  The history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, in particular, provides 
powerful evidence that the framers used the phrase “unreasonable search and seizure” as a way to 
describe general warrants—that is to say, warrants issued in derogation of the requirements of the 
warrant clause.  See id. at 85–107. 
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warrants under existing doctrine. 
The Court was on firm ground in finding evidence of the “notice” rule in 
pre-1791 common law.361  The starting point is the ancient common law 
maxim that a man’s house is his castle.362  That claim is at the same time 
majestic and overstated: there were (and are) many circumstances in which a 
person’s home must give way to unwanted government intrusions.  But the 
core notion expressed by this maxim—the individual’s right to privacy in the 
home against government intrusion—was felt concretely by British subjects 
both in England and the colonies leading up to the American revolution and 
the drafting of the Fourth Amendment in 1791.363   
The government’s right to break into a subject’s house pursuant to valid 
process was limited by “an important qualification,” articulated in the now-
landmark 1603 decision of Semayne’s Case: 
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, 
and to make request to open doors . . . , for the law without a default 
in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which 
is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and 
inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; 
for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had 
notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it . . . .364  
The common law thus required police to notify the occupant of an 
impending search, and ask for the door to be opened, before breaking the 
 
 361.  See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 232, at lxv, 749; Davies, supra note 360, at 264 n.67 
(“Justice Thomas correctly recited common-law authorities that stated a knock-and-announce 
requirement for legal execution of a warrant.”). 
 362.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288).  See also 
William Pitt before Parliament in 1763, quoted by Justice Douglas, dissenting, in Frank v. 
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378–79 (1959) (“‘The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all 
the force of the Crown.  It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the 
storm may enter, the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not 
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!’”). 
 363.  CUDDIHY, supra note 232, at 105–28 (Chapter 5, English Thought on Search and Seizure, 
1642–1700); id. at 185 (“Resistance to the searching constable was an ingrained part of the legal and 
intellectual history of the colonies.  Although their arguments were more visceral than intellectual, 
many ordinary colonists regarded not only their cabins but also their ships and even their persons as 
sanctuaries against the government.”); id. at 185–88 (“Popular Opinions on Search and Seizure in 
the Colonies, to 1760”).  
 364.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931–32 (quoting Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195–96 
(K.B.)). 
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door forcibly.365 
What was the nature of this “notice” requirement?  In the Case of 
Richard Curtis, in 1757, the court explained that “[n]o precise form of words 
is required,” so long as “the party hath notice, that the officer cometh not as 
a mere trespasser, but claiming to act under a proper authority.”366  A few of 
the nine judges in that case expressed the view that “for want of this due 
notice the officers are not to be considered as acting in discharge of their 
duty, but as mere trespassers.”367  Several early cases refer to the principle as 
one of “demand and refusal.”368 
Sir Mathew Hale stated that “the officer may break open the door . . . if 
after acquainting them of the business, and demanding the prisoner, he 
refuses to open the door.”369  In a British case decided a decade after the 
Fourth Amendment was drafted, Justice Heath stated emphatically: “The law 
of England, which is founded on reason, never authorises such outrageous 
acts as the breaking open every door and lock in a man’s house without any 
declaration of the authority under which it is done.”370   
Many pre-revolutionary authorities support this principle.371  The 
“notice” principle continued to be repeated in cases in the decades following 
the 1791 drafting of the Fourth Amendment.372  In Read v. Case, an 1822 
 
 365.  See id. 
 366.  Id. at 932 (quoting Case of Richard Curtis, (1757) 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (K.B.)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 367.  Case of Richard Curtis, 168 Eng. Rep. at 67–68. 
 368.   Hitchens v. Stephens, (1682) 84 Eng. Rep. 1233 (K.B.); The King v. Bird, (1690) 89 Eng. 
Rep. 811, 812 (K.B.). 
 369.  See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 932 (quoting 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *582) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 370.  Ratcliffe v. Burton, (1802) 127 Eng. Rep. 123, 126 (K.B.). 
 371.  See, e.g., Hitchins, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1233 (resolving “[t]hat the constable or other officer 
having a warrant to levy the money adjudged by the justice to be levied by force of the said Act, may 
on demand and refusal, break open the door to execute his warrant.”); Bird, 89 Eng. Rep. at 812 
(“[U]pon a capias utlagatum, though on mesne process, and at the suit of the subject, yet upon that 
writ they may break open any outward doors after demand and refusal.”); see also CUDDIHY, supra 
note 232, at 749 (“In most states, custom, practice, or legislation required seachers to request 
admittance into a house and break in only if they had to.  Every legal manual for American justices 
of the peace between 1788 and 1791 forbade unannounced, forcible entry to accomplish an arrest.”). 
 372.  Hutchison v. Birch, (1812) 128 Eng. Rep. 473 (determining that once officers lawfully enter 
the house, they need not further provide notice and demand before breaking the inner doors of a 
house; opinion assumes that notice and demand must be given before breaking the outer door); 
Ratcliffe v Burton, (1802) 127 Eng. Rep. at 126–27 (noting that it is “necessary for the officer to 
make a demand,” and that entry without demand “must tend to create fear and dismay, and breaches 
of the peace provoking resistance”).  
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Connecticut case, the court refers to this principle as “the rule requiring 
notice.”373   
As Wilson makes clear, there are circumstances in which this “notice” 
principle does not apply—such as danger to the officers or escape of a 
suspect.374  It is not clear then that delayed notice search warrants would be 
unconstitutional, were they to be subjected to this rule.  For purposes of this 
article, however, I simply seek to establish that delayed notice search 
warrants do raise a serious constitutional issue, and must be squared with the 
Fourth Amendment rule requiring notice.375    
2.  Covert, Delayed Notice Searching Presumptively Violates the “Rule 
Requiring Notice” 
In the most straightforward sense, a covert, delayed notice search 
plainly infringes on the “rule requiring notice.”  An application for a delayed 
notice search is a request by the searchers to be permitted to break into a 
house without “signify[ing] the cause of his coming,” or “mak[ing] request 
to open doors.”376  A delayed notice searcher enters the home without “first . 
. . announc[ing] his presence and authority.”377   
A delayed notice search is simply a more extreme version of a no-knock 
search.  In a no-knock search, notice is delayed by a minute or two.378  There 
is no prior notice of the search, but notice occurs immediately upon entry by 
the government officials.379  In a delayed notice search, the notice is delayed 
much longer—by weeks or months, rather than minutes.380   
Notwithstanding the fact that a delayed notice search plainly implicates 
the notice requirement recognized in Wilson v. Arkansas, no court has ever 
 
 373.  Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822). 
 374.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934–36. 
 375.  In a separate article, I examine the common law and constitutional exceptions to the “notice” 
rule, and compare those exceptions to the statutory rules permitting delayed notice warrants under 
section 3103a.  Witmer-Rich, supra note 36.  I conclude that the current statutory scheme is 
unconstitutional, as it fails to limit the intrusion of a covert search to cases of sufficient government 
necessity.  Id. 
 376.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931–32 (quoting Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195–96 
(K.B.)). 
 377.  Id. at 929. 
 378.  See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1998) (police gave notice 
simultaneously with entry). 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (2012) (permitting notice to be delayed for up to thirty days). 
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discussed Wilson in the context of delayed notice search warrants.381  On the 
contrary, many courts analyzing delayed notice search warrants treat “notice 
of a search” as a relatively unimportant, ministerial detail.  In one recent 
delayed notice search warrant case, United States v. Christopher, the court 
stated that “[t]he procedural requirements for giving notice after execution 
of a valid search warrant are ministerial tasks and a failure to comply 
therewith, without more, does not amount to deprivation of Fourth 
Amendment rights necessitating suppression.”382  The court found it 
“difficult to accept the proposition” that an otherwise reasonable search 
could be “invalidated because of the operation of some condition 
subsequent, to-wit, a failure to provide notice.”383  This is a startlingly casual 
approach to covert searches, given the Supreme Court’s statement that “the 
reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law 
enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to 
entering.”384   
Courts and commentators do not explain why the notice rule from 
Wilson does not apply to delayed notice searches—they simply disregard 
Wilson entirely.  It appears that courts and commentators have placed 
delayed notice search warrants firmly into one doctrinal box, and placed the 
Wilson “notice” rule firmly into the “knock and announce” doctrinal box.  
Having separated these rules into discrete conceptual categories—without 
explaining why they do not overlap—courts and commentators have then 
 
 381.  Wilson v. Arkansas is not cited in any of the cases (after 1995, when Wilson was decided) 
analyzing delayed notice search warrants.  See supra note 86.  None of the delayed notice search 
warrant cases, starting with Freitas in 1985, discuss the common-law “knock and announce” 
requirement.  See supra note 86.  None of the law review articles analyzing delayed notice searches 
discuss the practice under the rubric of Wilson or the “knock and announce” requirement, except for 
one, which erroneously states that under Wilson notice is not a constitutional requirement.  See supra 
note 350 (criticizing Konovalov, supra note 15, at 461–64).  Nathan Seltzer discusses Wilson v. 
Arkansas in connection with delayed notice search warrants, but only to observe that “it is probable 
that a general reasonableness standard would apply to sneak and peek searches.”  Seltzer, supra note 
228.  Seltzer does not consider the notion that covert searching is simply a straightforward violation 
of the “knock and announce” rule.  Id.  Thomas Clancy, in his Fourth Amendment treatise, explains 
the “knock and announce” requirement in section 12.5.4, and then discusses “notice of a search” in 
the following section 12.5.5 (“Other rule based execution issues”), without connecting the two issues 
or explaining the (implied) distinction between them.  THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 594–97 (2008).  
 382.  United States v. Christopher, No. 2008-0023, 2009 WL 903764, at *7 (D.V.I. Mar. 31, 
2009). 
 383.  Id. (citing United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 499 (3d Cir. 1973)). 
 384.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931. 
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proceeded to analyze cases within one box or the other box, without ever 
pausing to consider the underlying logic connecting the two.  There is, 
perhaps, room for argument over whether the constitutional “knock and 
announce” requirement somehow does not apply to delayed notice searches.  
But there is no justification for the total failure of courts and commentators 
to engage in the argument at all.  
The language of the early common law cases—relied upon by the Court 
in Wilson v. Arkansas as the foundation of the “knock and announce” rule—
is not confined to “knock and announce.”  One case refers to “the rule 
requiring notice.”385  Several early cases refer to the principle as one of 
“demand and refusal.”386  Another case explains that officers searching 
without “due notice” are “mere trespassers.”387  The key is that “the party 
hath notice, that the officer cometh not as a mere trespasser, but claiming to 
act under a proper authority.”388   
The phrase “knock and announce” has been used as a shorthand in 
modern cases,389 but is never used in the pre-1791 cases.  And the phrase 
“knock and announce” does not capture the core command of this common 
law (and constitutional) doctrine.  A literal knock, for example, is not 
required—ringing a bell or simply shouting to request entry could do as 
well, depending on the circumstances.390  The essence of the rule is 
“notice,”391 “demand[,] and refusal.”392  The key steps are (1) notice of the 
search—alerting the occupant that an official (acting on behalf of the state) 
intends to enter and search the home; (2) demand for entry—requesting that 
the occupant let the officer enter without the need to use force; and (3) 
refusal—giving the occupant a reasonable time to comply with the demand 
for entry before (upon refusal) forcible entry.393  
 
 385.  Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822). 
 386.  Hitchens v. Stephens, (1682) 84 Eng. Rep. 1233 (K.B.); King v Bird, (1690) 89 Eng. Rep. 
811, 812 (K.B.). 
 387.  Case of Richard Curtis, (1757) 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (K.B.). 
 388.  Id. (quoted in Wilson, 514 U.S. at 932). 
 389.  See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589 (2006); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. 398, 407 (2006).  
 390.  Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 401 (officers opened a screen door and then announced their 
presence verbally). 
 391.  Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822). 
 392.   Hitchens v. Stephens, (1682) 84 Eng. Rep. 1233 (K.B.); King v Bird, (1690) 89 Eng. Rep. 
811, 812 (K.B.). 
 393.  See William D. Bremer, What Constitutes Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in 
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Thus understood, a delayed notice search warrant plainly implicates this 
aspect of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  In a covert search, the police 
deliberately plan the search so that the occupant will not be present and 
cannot be given notice of the search.  This likewise precludes the police 
from making a demand for entry and waiting for a refusal—with no one 
home, these measures would be nothing but a charade. 
The Supreme Court has also made clear, not only in Wilson, that the 
Fourth Amendment does not require notice in all circumstances.  In United 
States v. Dalia, the Court held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing 
otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.”394  The defendant in Dalia 
argued that the police violated the Fourth Amendment by covertly entring 
his office to install bugging equipment.395  The Court called that argument 
“frivolous,” noting that the Court had earlier stated that “officers need not 
announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly] authorized 
search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or 
the destruction of critical evidence.”396   
Courts and other parties have relied on Dalia to argue that notice is not 
part of the Fourth Amendment at all.397  This claim is overstated.  Wilson 
held that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily does require notice of a search,398 
and Dalia is consistent with this view.399  Wilson also explained that notice is 
not always required.400  In Dalia, the Court implicitly linked the question of 
delayed-notice searches with the “notice” rule first given constitutional 
 
Search of Private Premises—State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5th 1, 29 (2001). 
 394.  Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979). 
 395.  Id. at 246. 
 396.   Id. at 247–48 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967)). 
 397.  See, e.g., United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Christopher, Crim. No. 2008-0023, 
2009 WL 903764, at *7 (D.V.I. 2009) (“The procedural requirements for giving notice after 
execution of a valid search warrant are ministerial tasks and a failure to comply therewith, without 
more, does not amount to deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights . . . .”).  The DOJ white paper on 
delayed notice search warrants relies on Dalia.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DELAYED NOTICE SEARCH 
WARRANTS: A VITAL AND TIME-HONORED TOOL FOR FIGHTING CRIME (2004).  The House Report 
for the USA Patriot Act Reauthorization asserts that the “U.S. Supreme Court expressly held in 
Dalia v. United States that the Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement to give 
immediate notice of the execution of a search warrant.”  H.R. REP. Nos. 109-174, pt. 1, at 22 (2005) 
(citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979)).   
 398.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995). 
 399.  Dalia, 441 U.S. at 247–48. 
 400.  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. 
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status twenty years later in Wilson.401  The Court in Dalia explained that the 
Fourth Amendment did not always require notice, and cited exceptions to 
the “knock and announce” rule (as articulated in Katz) as support for that 
position.402  Dalia did not hold that notice is never required by the Fourth 
Amendment—a claim that would have been plainly at odds with the holding 
in Wilson.   
While a covert, delayed notice search plainly violates the “rule requiring 
notice,” it can be argued that the common law “knock and announce” 
requirement addresses a separate set of privacy concerns than those 
implicated by covert, delayed notice searches, and thus that the common law 
“notice” requirement should be confined—as courts have implicitly done to 
date—to the “knock and announce” context.  It is important, then, to 
evaluate the purposes served by the common law “knock and announce” 
rule, and compare those purposes to the practice of covert, delayed notice 
searching.   
3.  Covert Searching and No-Knock Searching Each Implicate 
Overlapping Privacy Interests 
A comparison of interests shows that delayed notice searches implicate 
some of the same interests as no-knock searches, but do not implicate 
others—or at least not in the same way.  The interests affected by these two 
types of “no-notice” searches are sufficiently similar in character, however, 
as to justify treating covert, delayed notice searches as a species of “no-
knock” search, subject to the “notice” requirement recognized in Wilson.  In 
fact, covert, delayed notice searches impose privacy costs that are much 
more substantial than those created by no-knock searches alone, and that 
further show the need for closer Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 
The purposes of the so-called “knock and announce” rule are fairly well 
settled.  First, the most basic concern is the physical damage done by the 
break-in—damage that might have been avoided had the occupant, with 
notice, simply opened the door to comply with the warrant.403  A second 
 
 401.  Dalia, 441 U.S. 238. 
 402.  Id. at 247–48 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967)). 
 403.  Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195–96 (K.B.) (“great damage and 
inconvenience might ensue to the party” who, had he known of the process, might have obeyed it).  
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 905 
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concern is the “fear and dismay” created by a no-knock search—the 
unpleasant surprise of strangers breaking into one’s home.404  Stated 
differently, the notice rule protects “those elements of privacy and dignity 
that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance.”405  Third, and following on the 
heels of “fear and dismay,” is the concern that an unannounced search might 
provoke violent resistance from the surprised occupant.406  Thus, early courts 
stressed that it was important not only that searchers give notice that 
someone was about to invade, but also that the invader was acting pursuant 
to lawful authority.407 
Some of these same concerns apply to delayed notice searches, or apply 
in a different manner.  Some of these concerns do not apply.  Delayed notice 
searches also give rise to additional privacy concerns not threatened by 
traditional searches.   
First, the physical damage caused by breaking open doors may or may 
not occur with a delayed notice search.  In some cases—at least today—the 
government picks the lock or otherwise gains entry without causing any 
physical damage.408  This is often true in “sneak and peek” cases, where 
officials conduct a search and perhaps take photographs or photocopy 
 
(2002); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 140–42 (1970) (citing cases). 
 404.  Ratcliffe v Burton, (1802) 127 Eng. Rep. 123, 126 (“The law of England, which is founded 
on reason, never authorises such outrageous acts as the breaking open every door and lock in a 
man’s house without any declaration of the authority under which it is done. Such conduct must tend 
to create fear and dismay, and breaches of the peace by provoking resistance.”); Maclin, supra note 
404, at 905.   
 405.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). 
 406.  Launock v. Brown, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B.) 483 (“[H]ow is it possible for a party to 
know what the object of the person breaking open the door may be? He has a right to consider it as 
an aggression on his private property, which he will be justified in resisting to the utmost.”); 1 JOEL 
PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OR, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND 
EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 201 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1880) 
(quoting Launock, 106 Eng. Rep. at 483); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.  
 407.  Case of Richard Curtis, (1757) 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (“[N]o precise form of words is 
required in a case of this kind. It is sufficient that the party hath notice, that the officer cometh not as 
a mere trespasser, but claiming to act under a proper authority . . . .”). 
 408.  See, e.g., United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Villegas, 
899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Christopher, Crim. No. 2008-0023, 2009 WL 903764 
(D.V.I. Mar. 31, 2009); United States v. Hernandez, No. 07-60027-CR, 2007 WL 2915856 (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 4, 2007); United States v. Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tex. 1995).  The opinions in these 
cases do not explicitly state that no physical damage occurred, but that can reasonably be inferred.  
In each case, the searches were conducted covertly, nothing was seized, and care was taken not to 
leave any evidence that would tip off the occupant that the search had occurred.  Id. 
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documents but do not remove anything.409  In other cases, however, the 
government gains entry by damaging a lock, door, or window.410  As noted 
above, in “sneak and steal” cases in which the government actually seizes 
goods, officials often stage the break-in to resemble a robbery so as to 
prevent the occupant from suspecting a government search.411  In addition to 
the physical damage of the actual break-in, these “sneak and steal” cases 
sometimes include additional property damage—not required for the actual 
break-in—inflicted solely to create the ruse of a private burglary.412  
The second concern, “fear and dismay,” applies to delayed notice 
searches in a different way than it applies to no-knock searches.  In a no-
knock search, occupants experience the subjective fear and distress caused 
by an unexpected break-in of government officials.413  In a delayed notice 
search, executed without the occupants’ knowledge, there is no one present 
to experience the sudden alarm and surprise of government officials 
breaking into one’s home.414   
Delayed notice searches, however, create other forms of “fear and 
dismay” that invade on the “elements of privacy and dignity” of the home.415  
In all delayed notice cases, the searched party experiences some type of 
dismay upon eventually being notified that the government searched her 
 
 409.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 410.  See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.) (After 
secret search of a car, “[t]he team leaders directed the personnel conducting the search of the vehicle 
to make it appear as though the vehicle had been vandalized while it was left unattended on the side 
of the Thruway.  They broke a pool cue found in the back of the car, presumably belonging to the 
vehicle’s occupants, and used it to pry open the glove compartment, damaging the glove 
compartment and making it appear as if there had been an attempted break-in.”); United States v. 
Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005) (agents conducted a covert search, “removed three 
pounds of methamphetamine,” and made “it appear that a burglary had been committed”); United 
States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2005) 
(officers seized drugs during a covert search and “left a California license plate in order to divert any 
suspicion from law enforcement and toward other individuals,” presumably causing property 
damage as well); James Ewinger, Federal Investigators Used Delayed-Notice Search Warrant to 
Help Crack Greater Cleveland Heroin Ring, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 26, 2010, 2:01 PM), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2010/09/federal_investigators _used_del.html (describing a staged 
break-in in Akron, Ohio, in 2006 in which authorities seized “half a ton of marijuana and $2.8 
million in cash”).  
 411.  See supra note 410 and accompanying text. 
 412.  Id.  
 413.  See supra notes 404–05 and accompanying text. 
 414.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 415.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006); see also supra Part II.A. 
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home or business weeks or months earlier.416  Rather than being startled at 
the presence of unexpected officers breaking into one’s house, the searched 
parties learn that weeks or months earlier, “strangers [were] walking through 
and visually examining the center of [their] privacy interest, [their] home,” 
without the occupants having known they were there.417  Much like a person 
who returns home to discover his or her home broken into, the occupant 
experiences the loss of privacy and dignity caused by the knowledge that an 
uninvited, unwanted stranger has been present inside one’s home.418 
In “sneak and steal” cases, the occupants suffer the additional fear and 
dismay of believing their home has been robbed.419  For those present during 
a “no-knock search”—when the government breaks in without notice—there 
is the sudden fear and alarm of experiencing a home invasion, a fear that 
substantially abates upon learning that the invader is a government official, 
not a burglar.  For targets of a “sneak and steal” search, the sudden alarm is 
not as acute (there are no strangers bursting through the door), but the 
dismay lasts longer.  The belief that some burglar invaded the home is not 
resolved within minutes, as in a conventional unannounced search, but may 
last weeks or months, until the occupants eventually receive notice of the 
government search.420  Thus, targets of a “sneak and steal” search suffer the 
fear and dismay of criminal victimization.   
Finally, as explained in Part II, covert searches invade the “privacy and 
dignity” of all homes in the community, by creating uncertainty among all 
members of the community over whether the government has secretly 
searched his or her home.  This broad but shallow privacy loss, born by 
everyone in the community, is an invasion into the dignity and privacy that 
makes one’s home feel like a “castle and fortress.”  It is an additional 
invasion into privacy that does not occur in “no-knock” searches. 
The third concern underlying the “knock and announce” requirement is 
that occupants might violently resist an unannounced search by government 
officials.  This danger applies differently in the context of delayed notice 
searches.  Assuming the covert search is done competently—that is, when 
officers covertly enter with good reason to believe no one is present—there 
 
 416.  See supra notes 227–35 and accompanying text. 
 417.  United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 418.  See supra notes 227–35 and accompanying text. 
 419.  See supra Part II.B. 
 420.  See supra Part II.B; see also supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
[Vol. 41: 509, 2014] The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
584 
is minimal danger of an immediate violent confrontation from the occupants.  
As noted above, however, a delayed notice search can create a different risk 
of violent confrontation—violence by the resident against private third 
parties suspected to be the perpetrators of the staged break-in.421   
As argued above, delayed notice searches—as a matter of literal search 
mechanics—are simply a more extreme version of a no-knock search, with 
the notice delayed by weeks or months rather than minutes.422  When 
considering the underlying interests protected by the “knock and announce” 
rule, a similar conclusion can be drawn: delayed notice searches implicate a 
similar (although somewhat different) set of inte rests implicated by “no-
knock” searches, and also impact the privacy interests of the entire political 
community in a broader manner not implicated by “no-knock” searches.   
In sum, both as a matter of basic search mechanics and underlying 
principles, the constitutional command of providing advanced notice of a 
search—absent special circumstances—applies both to no-knock searches 
and to delayed notice searches.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Congress passed § 3103a ostensibly to codify and unify the existing 
practice of covert, delayed notice searching, and to provide law enforcement 
with the tools it needed to fight terrorism.423  A few years later, in apparent 
recognition of the potential dangers of “sneak and peek” searches, Congress 
passed a reporting requirement to monitor the practice.424  The resulting data 
shows an explosion in covert searching with delayed notice warrants.425  As 
explained, however, this data cannot be taken at face value—data on “sneak 
and peek” searches is likely being mixed with data on other forms of covert 
searching.426  A relatively simple amendment to the reporting requirement 
(by Congress or through regulation) can fix this problem, and provide 
Congress—and the public—with the information it needs on covert 
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searching.427     
The practice of covert searching of homes and businesses raises serious 
Fourth Amendment questions that must be scrutinized by courts.428  The 
practice is a recent procedural innovation that must be viewed with 
constitutional skepticism.429  The history of search and seizure law up to the 
passage of the Fourth Amendment shows that a key component of the 
legality of a search is whether officials gave notice of the search and 
demanded entry before forcibly entering.430  Covert, delayed notice 
searching contravenes that fundamental Fourth Amendment principle.431  
This “notice” principle is not absolute, so it is not clear that subjecting 
delayed notice search warrants to this requirement would render the practice 
unconstitutional.432  The exceptions to the notice requirement, and how they 
apply to delayed notice search warrants, are taken up in a separate article.433   
Covert searching also imposes unique and substantial privacy costs on 
the entire community, not only those whose homes and businesses are 
actually searched.434  The practice creates uncertainty in the entire populace 
over whether the state has subjected its citizens to unknown searches435—
which is precisely why covert searching and surveillance are tools exploited 
by totalitarian regimes.436  The practice of covert searching is dangerous, 
especially if conducted frequently and with lengthy delays in notice, and 
must therefore be subjected to exacting constitutional scrutiny that has been 
largely absent in judicial decisions to date.437  
Courts and Congress can devise new procedural protections to limit the 
alarmingly rapid proliferation of delayed notice search warrants.438  Covert 
searching, with delayed notice search warrants, may sometimes serve 
sufficiently compelling government interests to justify the serious privacy 
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intrusion that practice entails.439  In a separate article, I propose several 
solutions that might accomplish this goal.440  Courts should authorize covert 
entry, with delayed notice, only when police show true necessity for the 
search, as that concept is used in Title III—that the only reasonable way to 
gather the evidence sought is through a covert search.441  This limitation, and 
others, would serve to strike a balance between permitting covert, delayed 
notice searches when the government interest is sufficiently compelling, 
while prohibiting the use of an invasive search technique when it is merely 
convenient.442 
As a first step, however, courts—and Congress—must recognize that 
delayed notice search warrants pose a serious danger to the Fourth 
Amendment guarantee against “unreasonable search and seizure.”443  And 
“sneak and peek” searching must be effectively monitored—as Congress 
intended—to assure that this invasive search technique is adequately 
controlled by meaningful judicial oversight and Congressional controls.444 
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